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Issue A001: Lack of Comprehensive Policy and Procedure Documentation
Issue A002: Public Posting of Audit Trail -- The paper audit trail should be posted on the Internet on election night by elections officials so anyone can review it.
Issue A003: Citizens' questions not being answered -- Elections Code section 2300, the Voter’s Bill of Rights, requires elections officials to answer question from voters. Elections officials do not answer questions in writing from oversight activities in a timely fashion.
Issue A004: No Ballot Inventory Report -- No report is generated regarding whether any errors occurred during SPUW, including the count of ballots.
Issue A005: No Seal Serial Number on Ballot Statements Serial numbers of the tamper-evident seals are not included on Ballot Statements.
Issue A006: Ballot Statements - Few balanced Only a few of the Ballot Statements had figures that balanced, and only one precinct had all the ballots correctly scanned. See Unscanned Ballots for a full analysis of this problem.
Issue A007: Ballot Statements - Removed Write-ins Not Documented Ballot Statements did not include a count of the number of write-ins and damaged ballots removed.
Issue A008: Ballot Statements - Office Use Section Not Explained -- Ballot Statements have an "Office Use Only" section does not include an explanation to allow the public to understand how it is being used.
Issue A009: Ballot Statements Not Scannable Ballot Statements must be scannable in their entirety, including signatures of precinct workers who sign them.
Issue A010: VBM Ballots Not Logged at Precinct VBM Ballots were not logged, counted, or reported by the precinct.
Issue A011: Spoiled Ballots Loosely Controlled Spoiled Ballots, both VBM and election day are not under strict control.
Issue A012: Collection Center Seal Logs Lack Serial Numbers - Authorized personnel at Collection Centers are required to inspect the tamper-evident seals, but there is no place on the log sheet to document the seal numbers nor to note whether the seals were intact.
Issue A013: Tally Center Reception Count Misleading
Issue A014: Tally Center - Write-Ins Removed and Not Counted - Write-in ballots are removed permanently prior to scanning.
Issue A015: Tally Center - Damaged Ballots On the Tally Center Logs, there is a checkbox for "Damaged Removed." However, we don't know why any ballot would become damaged and not be treated as "spoiled."
Issue A016: Tally Center - 99 Seals broken or wrong In the November 2008 election, Tally Center Logs documented 99 precincts that had wrong or broken seals, a 6% rate, and there was no investigation.
Issue A017: Scanner cards not Archived Memory cards used to capture the vote from each scanner are not maintained as a permanent record of the election.
Issue A018: Audit Log Insufficient The audit record available from the GEMS Central Tabulator does not provide sufficient detail to reconstruct the election.
Issue A019: No Comparison of Ballot Count There is no comparison of the number of ballots scanned, as reported on the report tape, with the number of ballots counted at the precinct nor by the count as read by the central tabulator.
Issue A020: No Log of changes to the Election Management System The Election Management Systems is updated when a VBM ballot is received. However, there is no audit log of each transaction.
Issue A021: VBM Ballots are not counted VBM Ballots are not counted after being removed from the envelope and before submitting for scanning, and there is no attempt to confirm the count of ballots as they are scanned.
Issue A022: VBM Ballots not precounted during scanning We were told that the scanner operator pre-counts the ballots as they run them, but this did not occur.
Issue A024: Scanner Tapes Not Accessible Scanner report tapes are no longer available early in the canvass.
Issue A025: Scanner Tapes Difficult to Process The audit trail provided by the current Ro V procedures include cash-register style paper tape which is difficult to process and sometimes impossible to read.
Issue A026: No Reconciliation Procedure Although the Ro V goes through a lengthy process of reconciliation which has been referenced in many conversations with them, this process is not documented in any procedure document.
Issue A027: No Operator Notes A log of all operator activities should be maintained.
Issue A028: No Reconciliation Report A reconciliation report should be provided that includes an explanation for any irregularities and provides a means to document that the canvass is complete.
Issue A029: Audit Devices Should be Allowed If no improvement to the audit log is possible, then audit devices should be placed on the serial interface cables that supply data to the central tabulator to allow a log of all communication from all scanner and DRE equipment to the central tabulator.
Issue A030: No Paper Trail for VBM and Provisionals Unlike ballots processed on election night, no scanner reports are produced and ballots are read directly into the central tabulator.
Issue A031: No Seal Tampering Report At present there is no report explaining tampered seals.
Issue A032: Archival Procedures Lacking There are no check-in and check-out procedures in the secure archive area and only documentation describing where the materials are in the storage facility.
Issue A033: PEMT Performed Prematurely The PEMT is performed too early after election night and does not include a complete set of ballots for the precincts under inspection.
Issue A034: PEMT - Notification on Web Site The Ro V should notify the public on the Ro V website regarding the selection and tally in addition to placing a notice at the front counter.
Issue A035: PEMT Random Selection Not Technically Correct The random selection of precincts procedure is incorrect and not generally applicable.
Issue A036: PEMT Computer Report Manipulation Vulnerability There is a manipulation vulnerability regarding how the computer reports are generated.
Issue A037: Manual Tally Done Backwards Current practice treats the output of the computer scanners as the known good result and the tally teams redo their work until they can match it. This is contrary to the principle that the tally teams should be the most reliable result.
Issue A038: PEMT Rescanning There is no provision in the current Post Election Manual Tally procedure to allow that workers rescan precinct ballots if the vote determined by the manual tally differs from the electronic scan. However, the Ro V rescans the ballots.
Issue A039: Tally Sheets too big to process automatically The Post-Election Manual Tally (PEMT) should use paper that is easily processed by automatic document feeding equipment.
Issue A040: PEMT Reports Incomplete The PEMT should produce a report for every race and every precinct, as suggested by the So S.
Issue A041: PEMT Should Reconcile to Rosters The PEMT does not look at the ballot statements and sign-in rosters, and are restricted to the ballots actually run through the scanners on election night.
Issue A042: PEMT Errors Not Addressed In the November 2008 Election, a number of errors were detected by the Post Election Manual Tally (PEMT) procedure. These issues were not addressed and the Ro V simply ignored them.
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