NRC Meeting 2012-06-18 Transcript

Participants - NRC

  • Elmo Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV
  • Thomas Blount, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region IV
  • Ryan Lantz, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch D, Region IV
  • Gregory Werner, Chief, Plant Support Branch 2, Region IV -- (817) 320-3984 --
  • Greg Warnick, Senior Resident Inspector, Region IV
  • John Reynoso, Reactor Inspector, Region IV
  • Victor Dricks, Senior Public Affairs Officer, Region IV
  • Lara Uselding, Public Affairs Officer, Region IV
  • Emmett Murphy, Senior Materials Engineer, Nuclear Reactor Regulation
  • Carl Thurston, Reactor Systems Engineer, Research


  • Peter Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Southern California Edison Company
  • Douglas Bauder, Vice President and Station Manager, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Southern California Edison Company
  • Thomas Palmisano, Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, Projects and Site Support, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Southern California Edison Company

Part 1:

Facilitator : RICK DANIEL

NRC is going to report on their findings, immediately following you will here a response from Edison,

Please Focus on degradation, tube wear

If there are questions later take a feedback form with you

Introduce NRC folks: first gentleman to the right is the regional director for region 4 ELMO COLLINS , then immediately to his left is TOM BLOUNT acting director for the division for reactor safety, GREG WERNER (in red shirt) branch chief and AIT team lead, (Bald guy) GREG WARNICK , senior resident inspector.

PETER DIETRICH, Senior vice president chief nuclear officer SCE, DOUG BOWER, vice site president San Onofre, TOM PAULISONE vice president of engineering, projects and site support

Elmo Collins: Thank you Rick, introduce another NRC member who is here : TOM HENCHMEN, technical assistant for NRC chairman Greg Jahzco

We all know that both units at San Onofre are shut down because what has proved to be a very difficult technical issues with the steam generators, start tonight buy saying issues are not resolved to NRC satisfaction. Understandably I think there is a lot of concern on your part and I think your concern is warranted. For tonight's meeting, we are here to present the teams preliminary results to Edison licensee and also to you tonight and we're gonna talk to you about those results

NRC is glad to be here to share with you what we know so far. This is a different public meeting than what we normally conduct. This is a n NRC inspection exit meeting this marks the end of the augmented team inspection of which we started several months ago and what you are going to hear tonight is the preliminary inspection results.

Tonight you are going to hear about what the inspection team found. No inspection report yet, that's to come, we are guessing in about 30 days. Initially the augmented inspection teams are instructed to focus on fact finding and information gathering. We have not made any decisions about the resumption of the power operations at San Onofre nor have we made decisions about whether violations occurred as a result of that inspection those will be indicated to you the areas requiring additional followup.

When the team gives its findings so I ask you tonight to keep the issues that the team describes within that context remembering that the issues are not final agency conclusions. Tonight’s meeting is what NRC considers the first in a series of public meeting we are gonna have to conduct associated with the followup of these technical issues. We are going to be conducting additional inspection, getting submittals from Edison in writing that we are going to be following up on so as they work through the issues and the NRC inspects them we will continue to conduct public meetings with you . We do believe additional work by Edison is needed and we do believe additional NRC inspection is needed and that will have to happen before NRC is in a position to make a decision about the acceptability about the resumption of power at San Onofre.

TOM BLOUNT thanks etc.

Before we get into he inspection results... team back ground..

Agency as a whole engaged as an inspection team and had support from not only region four but four other offices as well, including research and our nuclear reactor regulation office region 2 also provided support.

Some of the talent we have on this team included a steam generator tube integrity engineer, a thermal hydraulic specialist, a steam generator material removal engineer, quality assurance and control engineer, a design and evaluation engineer, all led by a branch chief from region 4 Greg WERNER who is going to give you the team results..... took very seriously...

GREG WERNER: overview of the event and steam generators themselves .

I'd just like to give a high level overview of the steam generator tube leak the licensee response to that event event, and what I personally observed Jan 31 2012.

The San Onofre plant is designed to rapidly detect small amounts of radioactivity, small amounts of leakage from the reactor system to the steam system using sensitive radiation monitors that continuously monitor and sample for radioactivity. It samples the steam as it makes its way from the steam generator to the turbine generator. Procedures are in place such that on indication of steam generator tube leaks actions are prescribed to put the plant into a safe condition to protect public health and safety. Finally, operators are trained on these types of events such that they can quickly diagnose problems and implement procedures and make the necessary decisions to minimize any radioactive release to the environment.

On the afternoon of Jan 31, I had just returned to my office from performing a plant tour as part of an inspection, at that time I heard a PA announcement about a secondary plant system radiation alarm. John and I, john is the resident inspector, we were both in the office, we went directly to the control room when we heard the PA announcement. Our offices are less than 100 yards from the control room so we were there within moments. Both john and I went there and observed actions to ensure that, to asses the conditions and assure that the appropriate actions were being taken. Upon arrival I determined that the plant had appropriately responded to the tube leak by identifying leakage from the reactant cooling system and alerting operators to the abnormal condition before any licensed release limits had been exceeded.

The operators responded in accordance with procedures to accurately diagnose the steam generator tube leak. They accurately assessed conditions to determine that a rapid power reduction and plant shut down was necessary . After the plant was shut down the operators promptly isolated the affected steam generator to terminate the radiation release and continued on to cool down and depressurize the plant. Because of the plant design, the established procedures and the skill and training of the operators, SONGS Unit 3 was placed into a safe condition and the radioactive release that did occur was minimized. Our regional experts have independently quantified the release and conclude that it was only a very small percentage of the release limits allowed by the plant license. Such that the release associated with the event did not represent a threat to workers on site, to the public, or to the environment.

(man from audience - MICHAEL AGUIRRE, former San Diego City Attorney): “what percentage?” (PMQ1)

GW- excuse me?

AGUIRRE- what percentage?

GW- it's a very small percentage

AGUIRRE- what was it?

GW-it was a very small percentage and go ahead and bring that up during the Q & A period and we will be happy to answer that

Woman from audience- what was it that was released? What kind of radioactivity?

Rick- Folks, hang on a second. Let the gentleman finish his presentation and we will answer questions at the appropriate time

GW, again to reiterate I work at the plant every day, went to the control room and assessed the conditions. I'd like tot just talk briefly about the steam generator conditions, function and some of the structural components so that you'll understand some of the terms as we go through the balance of this presentation.

The purpose of a steam generator is essentially to make steam out of water. It does this by acting as a large heat exchanger, that transfers heat from the primary radioactive system to the clean steam system where it boils water into steam. Hot radioactive water enters into the bottom of the tube area and travels up through the inside of the tubes, around the "U" bend, back down to the cold side of the bowl area and returns to the reactor to be reheated. The clean secondary water enters into the steam generator and flows down around the outside of the tube bundle and is then directed up around the outside of tubes of the tube bundle region where it's heated up, it boils into steam and that steam exits the top of the steam generator to go to the turbine to make the electricity.

Now I'll point out a few other structural components just again to aid in the understanding of terms that we will be using throughout the balance of this meeting.

A divider plate separates the hot and cold bowl areas. (PMQ2) That divider plate also helps to direct flow of the primary water up through the u tubes , it also acts as the support for the divider plate and the steam generator internals. It's hard to see in this picture but the vertical section of the tube bundle is supported by tube support plates . The tube support plates provide structural support to that vertical section. In the next picture again its hard to see but there are small holes throughout the tube support plates, there are several of them that go up through that vertical section, there are also flow channels the middle of the tube bundle region. The upper U band section of the tube bundles is supported by system of anti-vibration bars and retainer bars. The steam generators are 65 feet tall, 14 feet in diameter and they have a little less than 10,000 tubes throughout them to perform that function of transferring heat to the water . It was one of these tubes in one of these steam generators that developed a leak and resulted in the event that I just briefly outlined that happened on January 31 2012.

RICK: short break, too many people over capacity, move some folks outside.....

(meeting took a break, omitted from video)

Alright, we are going to continue, hold sign outside, but not while you are seated.

Man- freedom of speech doesn’t end at the door

RICK- I asked at the beginning that signs be held in the back so people don't get hit in the head.

GREG WERNER: augmented inspection team leader. Gonna go ahead and discuss the decision to conduct the augmented inspection.

During the pressure testing of the 129 tubes on the unit 3 generator, 8 of the tubes failed to meet the strength requirements necessary for tube integrity. Because the tubes failed, this resulted in conducting an augmented inspection.

Even before we made a decision to perform the augmented inspection, two Region Four inspectors were already on-site accomplishing the unit 2 in-service inspection of the steam generators. This was part of the normal NRC inspection program, we always complete a in-service inspection that looks at 100% of the tubes after the first outage for replacement steam generator.

After the tube leak on Unit 3 we also brought in Emmett Murphy from headquarters to assist. Emmett has over 30 years of team generator experience. SONGS inspected 100% of all the steam generator tubes on unit 2 and 3, almost 40,000 tubes. The NRC independently reviewed and analyzed the results of the tube inspections and based upon our review of the type of flaws on the unit 3 tubes and the large number of tubes with deep wear and over a long length of the tube the NRC had very good reasons to believe there to be multiple failures of the tubes on unit 3.

So even before the first tube failed, Region 4 was working to put together an inspection team and an inspection charter. Because of this we have inspectors onsite during the pressure testing. The augmented inspection team was initially onsite for 2 weeks, however the team has continued tot review large quantities of documents including the cause evaluations, the 50.59 evaluations, draft operational assessments, thermal hydraulic and vibration computer simulation models as well as numerous other documents.

In addition, various team members including myself have traveled back to SONGS to observe expert panels on the cause evaluation computer simulation operational assessment. To date the augmented inspection team has expanded well over 1,500 hours associated with this issue. As Tom Blount mentioned earlier, individuals with specialized expertise were brought in from region 4, region 2, office of new reactors, the offices of nuclear reactor regulation research and head quarters in Rockville, Maryland.

I'm gonna discuss the key items or objectives that the augmented team was tasked to look at. We developed an event timeline to look at the design, construction, shipping, installation and operation of both unit steam generators. We reviewed information to determine the causes, we looked at the operational activities on the units to see if there was impacts associated with those. We compared the differences in the design and manufacturing between the 2 steam units. We reviewed quality assurance and quality control associated with the design and manufacturing of both of the steam generators. We also reviewed implementation of the generic communications and industry lessons learned to see that they incorporated lessons learned that we have gathered over the last 30 or so years of steam generator use. We reviewed the steam generator simulation models and also collected info from the NRC risk assessment. We also looked at other areas such as radiological controls that Greg discussed.

One of the key areas that we wanted to understand was the differences between Units 2 and 3. Why was there more wear on unit 3 than unit 2? Because essentially the designs were identical. It's important to note that for the number of items, we not only looked at what SONGS did but we also gathered info from Mitsubishi. We looked at what the resident collected during the rapid shutdown at unit 3, we wanted to make sure that the operators at the plant responded appropriately to the event. The team looked at 100s and 100s of documents including design, manufacturing and operational information. We did our own independent comparison of the information between the units, we compared manufacturing information with design information (26:42) to check to see if the steam generators were built in accordance with the design. Where there were differences we reviewed the justification or the associated change authorizations.

Now I plan to discuss what the AIT found. Throughout the US nuclear industry this is the first time that more than one steam generator tube failed pressure testing. As I discussed earlier, because of the failure of the unit 3 tube leak, 100% of the tubes were inspected with subsequent pressure testing of 129 of those tubes on unit 3, during this pressure testing of unit 3, 8 tubes failed. The pressure testing identified the strength of the 8 tubes was not adequate and structural integrity might not be maintained during an accident.

It is important that both SONGS and the NRC understand what occurred and why. This is a serious safety issue that must be resolved to prevent further failures from occurring again and this info will be shared throughout the nuclear industry. Songs did use multiple independent consultants in steam generator manufacturers. Personally I've never seen such a vast collection of experts working together- they had academia, independent consultants, industry experts from different utilities as well as the industry itself and they also had 4 different steam generator designer and manufacturers looking at the issues.

These next 2 items that I'll be discussing are really the most important items that the NRC identified during the inspection activities. These are the ones that everybody, including us, were interested in. Actions will have to be taken to address these to prevent the vibration that leads the tube to tube wear from occurring again.

The team identified the primary cause of the unexpected tube wear was higher than expected flow velocities in the steam generators. Early in our inspections we independently developed a simplified mathematical thermal hydraulic computer simulation model of the steam generators in units 2 and 3. Using this, we determined that the computer simulation used by Mitsubishi during the design of the steam generator had under-predicted velocities of steam and water inside the steam generator by factors of 3 to 4 times. San Onofre also had 3 other steam generator vendors conduct computer simulation. The results of their computer simulation also showed significantly higher steam velocities and confirmed our results.

Now the next item that I'm going to discuss deals with the differences between unit 2 and unit 3. We looked at a number of different items, however, we only identified one item that we could essentially determine as a cause. The cause for the difference in the tube wear between the units 2 and 3 is associated with the manufacturing differences in the tubes and anti- vibration bars. For unit 3 the anti-vibration bars do not come in contact with the tubes as tightly as they do on the unit 2. Along with higher steam and water flows created the conditions necessary for the high vibration. So, essentially the tubes are not held in place securely enough so it allows them to slide, or vibrate. SONGS is continuing to analyze and develop additional actions to fix and prevent this from happening again.

Now what I'd like to talk about is the item or the items that the team identified that require additional follow up. However on this team we believe that only 2 are related tot the tube to tube wear, I'm just going o very briefly discuss these items.

There’s a post trip in-transient procedure. SONGS did not conduct a formal review of the reactor trip because they considered a plant trip when they shut down the unit so we are going to look at the procedure as well as the operator actions and assess if it was appropriate.

We are going to evaluate and disposition, and look at the numerous unit 3 loose part monitor alarms. The NRC needs to look at how these alarms were evaluated. We do have concerns that these alarms were treated as “nuisance alarms” vs. being evaluated in accordance with procedures.

The retainer bar design was not evaluated for vibration impacts. Although this sounds familiar, this wear is not related to the tube to tube wear. We are reviewing the design basis of the retainer bars.

We’re also gonna look at the evaluation of and the control of the unit 3 divider plate repair. This by far was the most significant difference between the two units and it has been discounted as a potential cause for the tube to tube wear.

The bowl of the steam generator that directs the reactor fluid into the tubes as well as the plate that separates the hot and cold reactor coolant had to be cut, ( bound?) repaired, re-welded and re-tested. Again we did not identify an issue related to the tube to tube wear for this repair. Unit 3 steam generator shipping requirements were changed form what was required as compared to unit 2.

There’s nitrogen pressure, dew point, and oxygen contents were not controlled or monitored. These items were supposed to be controlled to minimize corrosion on the internals of the steam generators.


MR. WARNICK: Item No. 6. Lack of tube bundle support for the steam generators during shipment. The shipping specification did not initially have a requirement for tube bundle support. I did have a requirement for tube bundle short, but it was not used during shipment. So again we're going back to look at that to see how that was the disposition.

We got to look at the shipping accelerometer data for Unit 3. Steam generator A.D.A., which one of the generators for Unit 3, had all accelerometer registered in excessive force, which could indicate mishandling during the transportation of steam generators. The N.R.C. was not able to determine if this was properly reviewed.

We are looking at the 50.59 adequacy. The N.R.C. is continuing to review the adequacy to SONGS 50.59. We did identify concern with a potential for using a different methodology than what was described in the updated final safety analysis report. SONGS changed the structural analysis method as well as the tube stress calculation and we need to do some additional reviews on that to determine if they should have asked for an amendment.

The next two follow-up items, No. 9 and 10, are the ones that N.R.C. believes are related to the unexpected tube wear. As I discussed previously, the manufacturing differences, Mitsubishi improved the manufacturing process, which sounds like it should be good. However, they didn't go back and look and see what that would do to the original design dimensions. They didn't go back and compare should they very reviewed, revised, shrunk the design dimensions. This resulted in a less rigid tube bundle, which contributed to the vibration issue.

And as I discussed before on No. 10 the computer simulation model, the Mitsubishi model under-predicted the behavior of the steam and water in the steam generators.

Again, as described earlier, the combination of those two, the higher than predicted steam water flow and the less rigid tube bundle for Unit 3, they vibrated and they caused the tube wear.

The N.R.C. will be conducting additional inspections to review each of these issues. We have been and will be requesting additional information from SONGS as part of our follow-up inspection activities. This complete my discussion to the augmented inspections activities. I'm going to let Tom Blant, turn it back to him. He's going as to summarize the key points associated with this inspection. Thank you.

MR. BLANT: Thank you, Greg. So what we'd like you to walk away from this inspection, understanding is, the N.R.C. does understand what the mechanistic causes of the tube degradation are. The thermal hydraulic conditions were not accurately predicted during the design phase.

However, additional actions, as Greg's pointed out, additional actions are being evaluated and developed by the licensee. And these additional actions will need to be inspected by us to insure that this condition will not exist in the future.

The N.R.C. is not done. We have not reached any conclusion. We've got more inspection to do. We recognize that and we want you to understand that we recognize that. We'll take as much time as necessary to insure safety, the safety of these facilities, and no decision to this point has been made.

With that, I'd like to ask Pete Dietrich if he'd like to provide his response.

MR. DEITRICK: Thank you, Mr. Blant. I'm Pete Dietrich, the Senior Vice-President and Chief Nuclear Officer for Southern California Edison.

In our comments tonight, we'd like to update you on the actions Southern California Edison has taken and will take as we work to completely understand the conditions of our steam generators and the effect on San Onofre.

I'll make some opening remarks and then Doug Bower, our site vice-president, will provide some comments about the current conditions of the units, the planned response to the tube leak and our learnings. Because we are a learning organization and we learn from all things that occur in our facility.

Doug will discuss our learnings in the area of our response. And then Tom Pommassano, the vice-president of engineering, will summarize our technical evaluation and the conclusions that we have reached to date. Much work has been done, yet we still have much work to do to fully understand and address what we have learned and then I will provide some closing remarks.

Just to start with, Southern California Edison's overriding interest is the health and safety of the public and our employees. Consequently, both San Onofre units are shut down and will remain shut down until repairs have been made and we and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are satisfied it is safe to operate.

We are disappointed that the situation has occurred and we recognize the impact on our stakeholders, including customers of Southern California Edison, San Diego Gas and Electric and the City of Riverside. We're also concerned about the concerns that you have, members of the public and also our neighbors.

Southern California Edison understands the significance of the unexpected tube wear and we agree with the facts presented tonight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. We appreciate N.R.C. insights into this situation and we pledge to continue to work with the N.R.C. to assure any remaining or additional questions are answered promptly.

Early on we recognized the seriousness of the situation. As a result of the complex technical nature of the wear, we recognized that we needed to assemble the very best team to augment our resources and the resources of the steam generator designer manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

As a result, we have brought together experts in thermal hydraulics and steam generator design from around the world to help us gain an understanding of the causes of this unexpected tube-to-tube wear and potential corrective actions to address it.

The experts include such subject matter experts from companies such as Areva, Westinghouse and B & W Canada. We have used this assembled team, as well as other industry experts and consultants to review the progress of our work and challenged the thoroughness and adequacy of our conclusions. And we will continue to do so.

With that, I'd like to turn it over to Doug to discuss the current status of the units and our response to the tube leak.

MR. BOWER: Thank you, Pete. I would like to cover the current status of the San Onofre units. Unit 2 remains shut down since January the 9th when we started our planned refueling outage, an outage that include that included a reactor vessel head replacement and planned full scope testing of our Unit 2 steam generator tubes.

On January 31st, the San Onofre operators shut down Unit 3 in accordance with plant procedures after detection of a very small tube leak on that unit. Their actions demonstrated the right, conservative decision-making and focus on protecting the health and safety of plant personnel and the public.

I observed from the control room our operators response. I was pleased with their calm delivered approach properly quantifying the leak and the execution of our plant procedures to safely shut down the plant.

In fact, in my discussion with the operators after the event, they told me that plant response lined up with their experience and training our simulator where they frequently trained -- I'm going to switch mics. Everything okay over there? Thank you.

So yes, to catch us back up. In my discussions with the operators following the shut down on January 31st, they confirmed with me the planned response matched what they were trained for, evaluated for in our plant simulator. And that evaluation is frequently done before our operators for steam generator tube leaks.

As a learning operation -- organization, we have reviewed our plant equipment, our procedure and our operator training programs as a result of the shut down on January 31st. We have improved our leak detection capability. (PMQ3) We have enhanced our operator training programs and built the lessons learned from this event into our plant stimulator training activities.

We have also reviewed the post shut down critique process and we have enhanced the procedures that tied the post shut down critique process to any plant (indiscernible word). Also we have shared this information in the industry. As Pete indicated, we are a learning operation. We're all about learning, building things back into our processes and sharing them with the industry.

In conclusion, our operators took prompt, conservative actions to shut down Unit 3, placing the very highest priority in protecting the health and safety of the public.

At this point I would like to turn the presentation over to Tom Pommassano to talk through insights and perspective on our open items, as well as Southern California Edison's technical work so far on steam generators. Tom.

MR. POMMASSANO: Okay. Thank you, Doug. Can you hear me okay in the back? Great. Thank you. What I would like to do is provide an update on the technical work to date on our investigations and talk about some of the upcoming actions that we have in place.

As Pete Dietrick has said and the N.R.C. has said, we have more work to do. We realize that. And we're being very deliberate and conservative in our approach to our work.

First, Mr. Warnick did a good job of giving you an overview of the steam generator's function of the plant design and the steam generator design itself. I just want to point out a couple of things.

Tom, if you highlight the steam generator. Two key functions we're talking about tonight. One is the transfer heat from the radioactive primary system to the secondary side to boil water to make steam that ultimately turns the turbine and generates electricity.

The other key function, and particularly from a safety standpoint, is the function of the steam generator tubes to prevent radioactive primary water from leaking to the secondary side. Those are the two key functions we're focused on in this discussion and in our current work.

Next slide, please. In this slide, a cut-away of the steam generator. We've already explained, or the N.R.C. has already explained the flow path. Just let me reiterate it. The hot radioactive water comes in through what's called the hot leg at the bottom, flows up through the steam generator tubes, around the U-tube bend, the top of the tubes, and down through the remaining straight portion and out the cold way.

The heat from that water is transferred to the secondary side to boil water to make the steam that exits the top of the steam generator. Of particular importance tonight is what's labeled the U-bent section. This is where the tube-to-tube wear has occurred that caused the tube leak in one of the tubes and also caused the damage in the other tubes that caused us to do the in-situ pressure test and caused the test failures. So it's the very top of the U-bend that we're going to be talking about where the tube-to-tube wear has occurred. Thank you, Tom. Next slide, please.

So let me kind of summarize the actions to date at this point. Following the Unit 3 shut down on January 31st, we performed a comprehensive and rigorous inspection of all 19,454 steam generator tubes in the two Unit 3 steam generators. Each steam generator has 9,727 tubes. Roughly 10,000 tubes per steam generator.

We did a comprehensive inspection of them. We've reviewed these inspection results with industry experts and identified the cause of the tube leak as unexpected tube-to-tube wear. This wear caused one tube to leak and caused the other eight tubes -- there were eight tubes that we talked about that failed the in-situ pressure testing.

Further inspection showed wear on 326 of the these 19,454 tubes. I'd like you to have that perspectives with those numbers. The wear is a very localized root area of that upper tube bundle that we saw on a previous slide. Based on the finding of this unexpected tube-to-tube wear, we elected not to restart Unit 2.

Unit 2 was in the process of completing a refueling outage, had already had all of its tubes inspected, and was in satisfactory condition to operate. We elected not to restart Unit 2 at that time. We wanted to make sure, given the unusual nature of this tube-to-tube wear in Unit 3, that we took every opportunity to inspect and test Unit 2 to help us understand what was going on with the Unit 3 steam generator tubes. We felt that was very important.

Recognizing the significance of this unexpected tube-to-tube wear, we assembled a team of experts to assist Southern California Edison and Mitsubishi, the steam generator manufacturer. You've heard this discussed by the N.R.C. and by Pete Dietrich. And in a minute, I'll talk more about that panel.

To date we have now completed extensive tests and analysis. We have done over 60,000 tests on steam generator tubes on both Unit 2 and Unit 3 and have performed significant analysis of the test results to understand the cause of the tube-to-tube wear.

As has been pointed out by the N.R.C. and significant note, there are differences between the two units. Unit 3 where experienced the tube leak had 326 tubes damaged by this tube-to-tube wear. Unit 2 had only two tubes which showed minor indications of tube-to-tube wear, so small it was almost undetectable.

It was our rigorous re-testing that identified two tubes that had minor indications. So Unit 2 is in much better condition than Unit 3.

The comments that Mr. WERNER had about the differences in the manufacturing tolerances between the units explains partially why Unit 2 is in much better condition than Unit 3 is with respect to tube-to-tube wear.

Next slide. The expert panel. This is significant. You know, in any outage, we start with our own expertise. We start with the manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

As we realized the significance, the usual nature of this tube-to-tube wear, we stopped and we formed a group of experts to assist us both on-site and off-site in an expert panels. We have brought in Areva, Westinghouse and B & W Canada.

All of those firms design, manufacture and test steam generators. They are competitors to Mitsubishi.

Q. Is that Babcock and Wilcox?

MR. POMMASSANO: Babcock and Wilcox, Canada. Yes. B & W, Canada. We brought in M.P.R. Associates, which is a leading problem-solving firm, both in the nuclear and non-nuclear industry, renown for their ability to deal with difficult, technical issues.

We immobilized EPRI, the Electric Power Research Institute. This is the electric utilities industries' research group where we do cutting-edge research across the board in the electric utility industry, including nuclear. This is where we share technical information and in the nuclear side, we maintain some technical standards that we operate and maintain our plants to, particularly for steam generators.

We also brought in other industry personnel from sister utilities of its similar steam generators with good expertise to assist us and as has been mentioned, some recognized academics and consultants who do serious research in thermal hydraulic analysis, vibration analysis, and steam generator testing.

So we have assembled a team, and I think it has been alluded to, this is virtually an unparalleled effort in the industry. The sharing, the cooperation, the critical nature of this work has been the best I have seen, and I think Mr. WERNER's comments have echoed that.

Now the team was established not to just assist us, but to also challenge our work. We wanted to make sure that we put in place not just getting good, solid technical assistance, but a good critical challenge.

We used an expert panel board process. The team forms up on site every three to four weeks, and we spend one to two days reviewing the result of our work to date, making presentations, getting critical comments and getting some re-direction, if you will, on things that they feel we should investigate more fully.

They've turned out to be quite valuable and we are continuing their use through our remaining technical work and our restart decisions as we formulate our final plans.

Next slide. So what have we determined in terms of cause? The specific mechanism -- you have heard the N.R.C. discuss this. I'll use the term. It's called Fluid Elastic Instability.

Basically, that is causing some of these tubes, these selected tubes, to vibrate excessively to where they are contacting adjacent tubes. That is not the way these steam generators are designed to operate. It's a vibration mechanism that should not be occurring. We see this. This is causing the excessive wear and it's in this limited area of the Unit 3 steam generators.

It is caused, this Fluid Elastic Instability or tube vibration, is caused by high steam flow velocities. This has already been alluded to. Very dry steam. In other words, very localized areas where there is very dry steam, very little liquid as the water is boiled to steam, and inadequate tube support structure, that anti-vibration bar structure in the U-bend region around these tubes that are experiencing wear.

The tube support structure is not providing sufficient restraint. So a combination of high stream flow velocities, very dry steam and the interaction with this tube support structure in the Unit 3 steam generators.

Again, we do not see much evidence of this phenomena in the Unit 2 because Unit 2 clearly has a tighter tube structure than Unit 3 does.

Our findings correlate very well with the N.R.C.'s comments on the thermal hydraulic analysis. These conditions were not predicted clearly during the design phase to be as severe as they are.

We are in agreement with the N.R.C.'s conclusions on that. And also the differences between Unit 3 and Unit 2, likely due to manufacturing tolerance differences and manufacturing process differences seem to explain the difference between Unit 2 and Unit 3. And we are in agreement with the N.R.C.'s Augmented Inspection Team on those.

Now we have a good understanding of the cause of the tube vibration which causes the tube-to-tube wear. Our expert panel has reviewed this several times. They have challenged us and they are in concurrence with our conclusion as far as what is causing the tube-to-tube wear.

Next slide, please. So the next steps. Again, I'd like to emphasize something you heard Pete be very clear on and the N.R.C. say, we are taking as much time as necessary to insure this is understood and this is properly corrected. That's been a theme from the start of this investigation.

We are following up with the Augmented Inspection Team's additional request. Two of their open items clearly are related to the cause. They have legitimate needs for more information on the other open items and our team is supplying that information as it becomes available and working with the inspection team.

We are designing and implementing our corrective actions to prevent this tube vibration from occurring, based on our understanding of the mechanism. We are developing additional information as stated in the confirmatory action letter which we committed to prior to restart that we know we need to submit, and we are continuing to work to develop intermediate and longer term solutions to this problem.

As Pete said, we are disappointed in this and we are working on longer term solutions. And those longer term solutions will require extensive analysis, mockup and testing prior to being implemented.

In summary, we've identified the cause of the unexpected tube-to-tube wear. We are in agreement with the comments as discussed by the N.R.C. tonight. We continue to take a rigorous, deliberate and conservative approach to complete our remaining actions, and we are taking as much time as necessary to insure safety.

With that, let me turn it back to Pete Dietrich.

MR. DEITRICK: Thank you. By bringing together experts in thermal hydraulics and steam generator design and conducting the rigorous tests and analysis mentioned by Tom Pommassano, we have determined the cause of the unexpected tube-to-tube wear. (PMQ4)

We are working on different options and solutions for the future. We have been conducting public outreach associated with this condition and we see this interaction tonight as very important to those efforts.

We do feel it is vital to continue to share our learnings with the public and with our key stakeholders. Because of the unique nature of the unexpected tube-to-tube wear, we will continue to focus on making not just the allowable decision, but the prudent decision, focusing our efforts on the short-term support of our customers and communities, as well as the longer term life of the plant. But most important, our overriding and paramount interest is the health and safety of the public and our employees.

We are focused on making safe decisions and we have been focused on making safe decisions since the onset of the tube leak on January 31st. We will continue to do so.

Consequently, the units will remain shut down until we and the N.R.C. are satisfied that the units are safe to operate. I can't emphasize enough: There is no time line on safety. Thank you. I'd like to turn it back to you, Mr. Collins.

MR. BLANT: Thank you, Pete. We appreciate those comments.

Looking at our path forward, it's important to note that the N.R.C. still has much more information to review. The cause evaluation has been completed by SONGS and they are working on additional actions to prevent to tube-to-tube wear from occurring again.

We currently do not know what the final actions will be. So for the N.R.C. to speculate on what is going to occur would not be appropriate. However, I will tell you what we do know. We continue to review information as it becomes available, and as the Augmented Inspection Team continues to review information, we ask SONGS additional questions. And we request additional information, as you've heard.

Our inspection will continue until we are satisfied we have sufficient for enough information to make a determination. Based on the confirmatory action alert, we will have to complete additional inspections when SONGS informs us that they are ready for those inspections. They will have to have completed all the actions required under the confirmatory action letter before we will go out and do those inspections.

Portions of our A.I.T. team will be called upon to go out and do follow-up inspections on the 10 items that we discussed earlier that were identified as part of this inspection.

The N.R.C. does plan to have additional public meetings to keep you informed of our activities. As part of our plans, we will have meeting with SONGS designed to present their readiness plan associated in response to the confirmatory action letter.

After we have completed our inspection, we will have another meeting to discuss the results of that inspection. In addition, there are type of public meeting and press conference that will be held by the senior management, N.R.C. senior management, to discuss any future N.R.C. decision about the acceptability of resumption of power operations. That decision will be based on discussions with both the Region 4 and N.R.C. headquarter senior management.

And finally, as part of our normal process in how the N.R.C. does business, we look back at our inspection program and we look to see are there things out of this event that we should have seen earlier? Are there processes that we should have been engaged in, to help us learn how to get better at what it is that we do. Is there something that we could have been doing do better in looking ast prior to this event occurring that would have precluded that event?

That is also to help our inspection efforts going forward. So with that, I'd like to turn it over to Elmo Collins for closing remarks.

MR. COLLINS: Thank you, Tom. To conclude the business portion of the meeting, I will say thank you to the residents of California for being here tonight and thank you for listening attentively. I have been quite amazed at that how polite and how patient you have been as we merge through a lot of information tonight. I thank you for that.

I want to thank this Augmented Inspection Team we've talked about. A lot of hours of work has gone on with people with high expertise. I'm glad we were able to hear the results of their inspection. I hope it was informative for you.

I want to thank Edison, Mr. Dietrich, for your presentation and response to information you shared with us. And lastly, I probably would be remiss, all express our appreciation to the representatives from the Orange County Sheriffs Office who are here looking out after our safety. Give them a round of applause. I know we really you do appreciate that service. With that.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Elmo. Thank you Southern California Edison and N.R.C. Thank you audience, ladies and gentlemen, for being so attentive, as Elmo pointed out.

We are going to take a 20-minute break. We will start back at 7:20 sharp with question and comment period. In the meantime, Mr. Collins is going to be doing a media interview, I believe, during the break. Enjoy the break. We will see you at 7:20.

(A recess was taken.)


MR. DANIEL: For those of you that may not have been here for the first 2/3. My name is Rick Daniel and I will be the facilitator here. This is the way we are going to try to work this tonight, folks. The job, my job is to try to provide -- be fair and balanced. I'm going to be moving about. I will approach folks. If you have a question, you raise your hand. I will come to you. We have our first question. Just a minute. Folks, we will limit questions and comments to two minutes. Okay. I'll be right with you.

Go ahead. Why don't you give us your name, if you like, and go ahead.

Q. (BY MR. STONE): I'm Gene Stone from Residents Organized for Safe Environment. On April 6, I had a personal meeting with [NRC] Chairman Gregory Jaczko as many of our local coalition did, and he promised us, as much as he could, that this meeting would be open for people to speak because of the last April meeting in San Juan Capistrano, the lights were turned off at 8:30 and we had to leave.

Now I understand and I agree that the steam generator issue is very important and we should talk about this issue. I agree with that for that tonight.

I would officially ask Elmo for the next meeting to be a Category 3 meeting so that we can actually discuss everything that the public wants to discuss with no limited time on that meeting. (PMQ6) If Elmo could tell me how to do that legally, publicly or whatever it takes to get that done with the N.R.C., I'll leave you my e-mail.

So my question is: How is it that 39 design changes did not trigger a complete review by N.R.C. and complete public hearings as is required by law? Has the law been broken by either California Edison, Mitsubishi or the N.R.C.? Thank you.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Gene. Greg.

MR. WERNER: Well, the 50.59 processes the regulation and by regulation, they were -- they were allowed to do what they did. Now to say that it wasn't reviewed, portions were reviewed by the N.R.C. Actually, there were two changes that required licensed amendments that were reviewed by N.R.C. (PMQ7)

The N.R.C. did do reviews of part of the design before the change integers were installed were, as well as the Augmented Inspection Team also looked at the design. As I said earlier, we are continuing our review. We did identify those two issues -- I mean the one issue, the 50.59 associated with the two changes to the code of record that was used. There are follow-up plans we have to look at.


MR. COLLINS: I'd like to add to that, to that response to your question. It's an outstanding question. It's one we got ourselves. Because of what was in the plant while the plant was operating, we had to be absolutely clear, what happened here and how did these steam generators get in the plant, what are the N.R.C. review processes, what are our regulations to make sure that this went the way that we want it. We are still looking at that. We haven't reached our final conclusion. We had that question, as well.

We indicated in the presentation -- this is part of the augmented team inspection procedure that we looked for these conditions, looked at ourselves, asked ourselves what else we need to do. That's a question we are trying to answer, as well. I think your question is right on the money.

With respect to the Category 3 meetings, I got to tell, we have been knocking our brains out, you know, how to do these meeting, as best we could. Among this one, we really would have preferred to have gone that route, we just couldn't quite to get to it with the information we wanted to present to you.

That is actually a question for our next meetings, series of meetings, which ones would be appropriate. We want to have those meetings so that we can have a better exchange of information, a better dialogue with you here in California. Thanks for raising that.

Q. Respectfully, we demand that type of meeting.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you. I'm going to come to this lady over here. Excuse me. Give us your name.

Q. MS. BECKER: Rochelle Becker Executive Director of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility. I have two questions. I thought I saw Mr. Craver here earlier. Is he here?

MR. CRAVER: Yes, I am.

[Craver is Chair and CEO of Edision International, who can make an independent decision to shut down the plant.]

Q. Okay. Hello, Mr. Craver. I have a question for you. If you could just stand up, because I think the whole audience would like to hear the answer.

My question is: Is there a number, is there an amount of money -- knowing that there is no amount of safety before you reopen, but is there an amount of money before you re-open? How much money do you expect your rate payers to pay before this plant re-operates?

Is there a break out point in which Edison decides this is just too much?

MR. DANIEL: Coming right to you.

MR. CRAVER: At this point all of our focus has been on trying to understand the technical aspects and what exactly is taking place here. What the mechanism of where it is, what the causes of where are and how we are actually going to address those.

As we get through the final evaluation of what the final fixes are, what those will look like, are those the same fixes for the near term as they are for the long term, then I think we will have a better idea of what those costs are.

I think it is actually really important for us to not get the financial piece into this at this point, for us to just focus primarily on the safety issues and primarily on what we are going to do to fix it.

MR. DANIEL: Hang on, folks. Hang on. Going to try to keep -- trying to keep the questions oriented towards the steam tubes. Is this a question on the steam tubes?

Q. MS. BECKER: Okay. This is to the N.R.C. We have just been told that you spent 1300 man-hours or 1500 man-hours or whatever for this review, however, you didn't spend this amount of time before you approved it and the State of California invested in these steam generators.

Is the federal government going to help in any way with the rate payer cost of this, or are we supposed to pay for your mistakes, as well as Edison's mistakes?


MR. BLANT: The agency -- you're asking for us -- how are we going to handle our regulatory responsibilities. We have an obligation to review the safety of these facilities and how they are operated. We will do that as we are mandated to do. When situations arise, that's why we have reactive inspections. We address those as they come up.

I guess I'm not sure how I would address that much beyond that. Please.

MR. COLLINS: Thanks, Rochelle. Good to see you hear tonight. It's been awhile. I think we already indicated we need to go back and look. Did we follow -- did N.R.C. follow our processes, which are implementing our regulations and was the right implementation and inspection programs that were put in place to look at this very thing. And our accountability, I think, goes to the oversight committee as we answer through Congress ultimately.

We have some representatives here. That hold us to that, to make sure we follow our processes. That's all I can do is follow my process from the regional office. We're doing our best to make that happen. If we're not, we want to be the first to fix it. We are going to take a look at these processes to see if they need to be improved because of what's going on here.

This is a very difficult, technical issues, to be quite honest with you, has not been seen before. That doesn't give anyone any comfort. We need to be smarter, upfront about these types of changes.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Elmo. This gentleman, you have a question. Stand up, please.

Q. My name is Jim Cummings, retired Southern California Edison employee. I have a question in regards to why the design was changed on the steam generators from the initial construction (PMQ8) to where we fabricated something out of the -- maybe different from what the final engineering public had to do, seemed like maybe remediation right there as far as the steam generator design.

MR. WERNER: I'll take that question. Of course the steam generators were different than what was originally put in because the original steam generators had to be replaced. So they had issues with the original generators across the industry and from a lessons learned standpoint, the numerous changes that had been incorporated in the new generators.

MR. DANIEL: We'll get to you. Steam tube generators.

Q. Staying on focus. Joe Holtsman, Mission Viejo. My question is one question. I would like to direct it to the N.R.C., perhaps you can take it and maybe Mr. Dietrich could take it.

Was there an failure mode effect analysis done on these designs before construction was started?

Q. The silence is deafening.

MR. WARNICK: Like Greg said, as part of the inspection process, we have a procedure that we implement for replacement of steam generators. We reviewed in part the 50.59s associated with the replacement steam generators.

We did not review it to the level of detail to determine if the failure mode analysis was done. Beyond that, Edison, if they choose to reply, they can shed some light on that.

MR. DEITRICK: Thank you. The steam generators were replaced using an engineering design change package, which does look at potential modes of failure of the steam generators and it looks for understood or anticipated modes of failure.

Included in our technical specification changes were two license amendments to change the plugging lights on the new steam generators compared to the old steam generators to move to a lower percentage of through wall wear to plug the steam generator tube.

We did look at and analyze the potential for wear affecting our steam generators. That was documented in our engineering change package. A failure modes and effects analysis is traditionally done in our business associated with looking at a new occurring problem.

So specifically to answer your question, it was not F.M.E.A., a failure modes effect analysis done per se. We are working through that part of our solution set and problem-solving situation.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you. I'll hand it to you. Okay.

Q. Why is it that Mitsubishi is not present at this meeting and the same for Areva and Westinghouse?

MR. BLANT: In this particular case for this meeting, this meeting the augmented inspection team results, it was as the N.R.C. providing our response to the licensee on what we have found.

Mitsubishi, Areva, others are vendors to that licensee, they are not the ones that we look to for responsibility associated with that facility. So if they were here, they would be here as an advisory capacity to the licensee.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Tom. Steam tubes?

Q. My name is Emily. I'm a concerned citizen and the Director of the California Public Interest Research Group, Statewide Consumer Advocacy Group. I'm concerned first and foremost about safety, but I am also concerned about cost to rate payers.

We are already paying for the steam generators that are now not operating and I'm wondering if Southern California Edison can commit to not asking rate payers to pay for those steam generators again should they need to be replaced.

MR. COLLINS: I'll start. I appreciate your question. We all know this is on the face of it a costly -- the plant has been shut down since January for a number of months. Just from N.R.C.'s perspective, we are primarily interested in safety.

I can't put myself in your shoes as a California rate payer, so I really don't understand how you're feeling, but I would ask you to look at us and say we are going to take a look at safety first and see where it goes.

Now I'm going to see if you want to -- Pete might add to that answer for you.

MR. DEITRICK: Thank you. You know tonight I came out to talk about specifically the augmentation team results and to talk specifically about what our learnings are up to this point.

I will share with you the concerns of our stakeholders, the concerns of our customers are very important to us and we are mindful of that as we go forward.

All of our discussions regarding costs or cost issues are ahead of us types of discussions. We will have opportunities to continue discuss that and it will play out very openly in front of the California Utilities Commission.

We are committed to providing that visibility to the situation going forward. But I think tonight it's important to talk about the technical situation and how we move forward over the next few months. Thank you.

MR. DANIEL: Going to move over here. I'm coming, folks.

MR. COLLINS: I hope some of you have questions. I've got a technical team sitting here in the front row. They're just dying to answer your questions.

Q. (BY MR. LUTZ): Okay. Ray Lutz with Citizens Oversight. Now you mention that the unexpected tube-to-tube wear was due to excessive steam velocity. The question is -- you said your simulation simulated it to be three to four times higher than the other simulation.

My first question is: Did you actually measure the velocity of the steam to find out if either of those simulations is any good?

Did you measure the velocity in the actual steam generator, No. 1?

No. 2, why is the steam at a higher velocity? That is not the root cause. You need to jump back and say: Why is it going faster? Is it because Southern California Edison modified these steam generators by adding 370 additional tubes and subtracting the certain supports and so fourth? Is that the reason?

What is the reason? Because you guys came in here saying you came to the cause of this and you give us no cause. This is not the cause.

So I want to know the answer. What is the cause of the excessive steam velocity? If you tell me it is because of something that happened somewhere else, then you have to ask: Why did that happen?

You're stopping just after one thing: Excessive tube-to-tube wear. That's why the leak started.

Why did that happen, excessive steam velocity? Why did that happen? Please go down that trail.

I want to know: Did you measure the steam velocity. Thank you.

MR. WERNER: Actually, that question is outstanding. We have to understand that SONGS owes us that answer as far as what specifically in the design change in the steam generator causing the higher than expected velocity, and as they talked about steam with fractions. They still owe us that. That's been something that we've discussed since we have been on site. I'm sorry. What was the other question?

Q. (BY MR. LUTZ): Did you measure the steam flows?

MR. WERNER: They do not measure steam flows within the steam generators. There is not that capability. The modeling is done based upon experimental data, as well as the empirical data.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. Another question about steam tubes. Yes, ma'am.

Q. All the simulations are deemed to be correct.

Q. Karen Stone from Laguna Hills. I wanted to know just how much radiation was released from 3 when it had its problem. You say it's minimal. How much was it? We need to know.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Karen.

MR. WARNICK: Thank you for the question. As I told you before, I was on site. I responded to the event. I full time, when I'm on the site, I wear a radiation badge that measures mild radiation. So I'm monitored. We independently verified and quantified how much release there was. The amount was 5.2 x 10 to the minus 5 millirem.

What that means, essentially, it was more than 10,000 times below what you would receive from, say, an x-ray of the arm or what each of us receives daily from naturally occurring background radiation, which is about one millirem. It was 10,000 times below that amount.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. Thank you.

MR. WARNICK: Essentially, on my radiation badge that I wear every day, that measures my radiation, it was negligible. It wasn't picked up at all.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you. Question. Gary Headrick.

Q. My name is Gary Headrick, representing San Clemente Green. 1500 citizens. I'd like to share more general observation that will cover the steam generator issue indirectly. Please indulge me while I read.

This is an intervention. The people that you are sworn to protect the ones that you ultimately serve are speaking up in a strong and forceful way because you are blindly following a path that has become an habitual routine.

Unfortunately, it eventually will lead to the destruction of everyone and everything for miles around if allowed to continue indefinitely. We can't simply let this situation continue any longer. We have been extremely lucky so far.

The reckless behavior of Edison that has been exhibiting over the years has got to stop. Edison's insatiable appetite for gambling continues to escalate when losing is virtually impossible thanks to the Price Anderson Act and winning is practically guaranteed simply by staying in the game.

This situation would be an irresistible temptation for even the most timid gambler. Having never lost, the obsession comes stronger. Yet the longer one goes on a winning streak, the more likely it is that luck will run out.

The nuclear regulatory commission is equally responsible for this situation reaching such an intolerable condition. Your good intentions aiming to make sure that the power we need is delivered in a safe manner has an inherent conflict of interest that can't be avoided.

You either have to put safety first or follow your loyalty to the industry from which you came. You have become the enabler in this relationship, a co-dependent partner torn between what is best for those you work closely with and the public at large.

It is with concern for the good of all that we must step in as interveners, reminding you that you must act responsibly and remembering your original obligations to the people and the environment.

MR. DANIEL: All right, Gary. Hang on a second. Is this going to result in a question about steam tubes. Another minute.

MR. HEADRICK: It's for a lot of people. The plain truth is that we don't need to gamble our families and our possessions in order to get the power we need for the comfortable lifestyles we are accustomed to. The last four months have been living proof of that fact.

The cost of continuing to support this aging nuclear power plant is not necessary. All of the consternation over evacuation rounds and sheltering, in place to escape radiation has vanished with this recent revelation.

The only responsible action to take is for Edison to transition to truly sustainable and safe conservatives before the competition gets too far ahead and for the N.R.C. to recognize that it is time to retire this old racehorse and deal with the extremely toxic waste that has been piling up in the stall for almost 30 years now.

MR. DANIEL: All right, Gary. Thank you. We'll get back to you, Gary. We'll get back to you.

MR. WERNER: I'd like to respond to that. It's important to understand that the N.R.C. safety is first. We do not have a schedule for restart. No decision has been made. And again, the units are not running because currently it is not safe to restart, until they go ahead and do actions to prevent tube degradation due to vibration.

The N.R.C. does not rely on luck, nor does the nuclear industry. The steam generators of the reactor itself, the design, actually incorporated looking at a steam generator tube rupture. So that was part of the design that the (? 23:35) respond to.

As Greg Warnick indicated earlier, that they had the detection equipment that properly detects the small leaks. Operators are trained. They go to training, extensive training. They are able to respond to the leak, isolate it, minimizes the leak, as well as multiple (? 23:51) in place.

So again, the plant design, the training and construction of the plants were specifically designed to combat accidents, including steam generator tube rupture. So there is no luck involved with that.

MR. HEADRICK: Can I finish one paragraph.

MR. DANIEL: Gary, I'll tell you what, as time permits, we will get back to you for the last paragraph. Okay. We're not going to forget you. Okay? I promise. We're going to get back to you. Sir.

MR. WEISS: My name is Rick Weiss and I have two questions, I think, are germane to this issue. They concern the tubes.

I wanted to know a little bit more about the details of the tubes. I understand that they're three-quarter of an inch diameter.

I want to know what they're made of, how thick the walls are and how they have been tested to withstand -- we have been talking about vibration -- how they have been tested to withstand the earthquakes that we have around here. That's a concern for me.

And the other question is in the event that they need to be replaced or something, what happens to them? I mean, where did they go, what plans do you have to dispose of them or restore them. Actually, what are your plans to -- that was a good question about nuclear waste piling up, I guess 30 years they have been piling up. We have been looking for solutions, waiting for solutions. Are there any new solutions?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Rick.

MR. WERNER: I'm going to let Emmet answer the question about the steam generator tubes. He's part of the augment inspection team, 30 plus years experience looking at team generators. Go ahead, Emmet.

EMMET: Okay. I believe one of the questions was what are the tubes made of. They are made out of inconel 690, chemically treated chromium iron alloy (? 25:40). Very corrosion, test corrosion, crack resistant, compared to the inconel 600 tubing used in the original steam generators. I'm sure I'm missing part of your question.

MR. DANIEL: Dimension, the size.

EMMET: The diameter -- the diameter of these tubes is three-quarters inch. The thickness -- wall thickness is .043 inches, 43 mills. The steam generators were designed for seismic conditions to stay within stress limits required by the code, the A.S.M.E., American Society of Mechanical Engineering, Section 3, Code Stress (? 26:32).

Q. How are the tubes attached to the sheet?

EMMET: The tubes -- each of the tubes is welded at the tube ends to the tube sheet and in addition, they are hydraulically expanded for the full thickness of the tube sheet.

Q. How far apart are they?

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you.

MR. WARNICK: I can't answer how far apart each tube is. Maybe you can get that information from Emmet. We can add that additionally.

EMMET: The tube pitch is one-quarter inch. In other words, the closest nominal dimension between the tubes is .25 inches.

MR. DANIEL: Thanks, Emmet.

MR. WARNICK: Your second question is what do they do with the steam generators when you replace them. That was actually part of our inspection, when they're replaced the old steam generators with the new steam generators.

The old steam generators are essentially decontaminated best they can. The cleaned portion is cut up and you know Edison, whatever they choose -- I think they sold most of the metal that they had for scrap. It was clean. There is a portion that is radioactive on the primary side of the tubes and that's shipped to low level waste facilities that are located throughout the country.

As far as the bigger waste question, as you're probably aware, that's something being debated in Congress. There was a blue ribbon commission that gave a report recently and that's something that's being determined at the energy policy level.

EMMET: Just one previous correction to what I said. That the minimum gap between the tubes is one-quarter inch. The pitch is one inch, plus diameter equal pitch.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Emmet.

Q. You asked about size --

MR. DANIEL: That was answered by Emmet. All right. Ma'am, do you have a question?

Q. Yes. Specifically what are the local -- where is the low level place -- places around the country?

MR. DANIEL: That's outside the scope of this meeting. That's something for another meeting. But you can put it on the feedback form and submit it and somebody will try to answer it for you. We are going to focus on the steam generators and the tubes, questions about the tubes.

A. Utah.

Q. Yes. I know that the nuclear regulatory agency has a lot of channel at its disposal. I assume also that there is independence.

I'd like to know as there are trained professionals if there is a minority report. I know that that's considered to be a little difficult. The N.R.C. has been under criticism because of the fact that there has been dissent and it's lead to people saying well, you're not playing the game right.

And we've had a recent hearing before Congress about all of this. We want independent professional opinion that this is a majority view and if there is a minority view about the safety of this because safety is supposedly your No. 1 concern and for that safety, you're responsible to us.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you. Your question is is there a minority report related to the steam tubes?

Q. Other than just the line that has been given to us here, universal opinion.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. Do you understand that question?

MR. COLLINS: Yes. First of all, I couldn't agree with you more in your comment and even to put a finer point on that, when you do have opposing views or differing views, that drives us to an even better conclusion when they're considered evaluated, and understood.

My definition of objectivity is I understand the opposing view. I might not agree with it, but I need to understand it when I make a decision. That's when I can look at myself and say I'm close to making an objective decision.

I've been watching this team work for a couple of months. If there is a minority report or non-concurrence, it will be documented in writing and it will available to the public. I can tell you right now, I am not hearing any. So far the team is fairly well consistent and it converged on what you've heard here tonight. So I think what this is really a team view.

MR. BLOUNT: If I could just add to that discussion slightly. One of the things that we were concerned with is that we would develop a mindset that said we're headed down this path and that was the answer and we put blinders on to this particular issue.

So we took the opportunity to bring two separate individuals that are outside the agency as experts to look at what it was that this team was putting together and we handled them as separate and distinct, much like the challenge on board to look at what the team did and what their findings were and how they went about doing their business to make sure that we got the best insight that we could.

With that, then, we were -- we did make the assession -- the determination that the team did do the inspection that we expected of them and we did reach the appropriate identification of issues.

MR. DANIEL: So in answer to this gentleman's question, Tom.

MR. BLOUNT: At the end of the day, we will, once the report is crafted, once we have finalized the report, it will be a publicly available document and it will be available on the N.R.C. website.

MR. COLLINS: Just to be clear. That's two reports. There's the team report and then there's this report that was prepared by the other engineers that we brought in to challenge the conclusions.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. Steam tubes. Steam tubes.

MS. STEMKE: My name is Janesa Stemke and I live in Riverside. The last I heard before tonight about the radiation leaks, I heard, "We don't have statistics on that. We need time. We want to take accurate measurements and these things take time."

That was the last I heard. That was back in February or something. We need timely and accurate radiation reports, released and made available to the public immediately. And if they cannot be provided, then you did not have the right to operate a nuclear power plant in this vicinity or any vicinity because the public needs to know this information.

And is there a radiation monitoring system made available to the public for this purpose and if not, it makes me wonder in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is actually paid on commission to keep nuclear power plants operating.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. WERNER: Actually, the N.R.C. does get information, annual report is published. It is important to note that the utility did measure the amount of radiation, as Greg Warnick said. They have detectors on the secondary side, the steam side and they picked up the amount of radioactivity and they analyzed that and came up with the release phase a couple of weeks after we actually had a radiation detection team from the regional office out here. They actually looked at it and looked at the values and confirmed the numbers.

MR. COLLINS: This is Elmo. I'd like to add to that response. I really appreciate the question. Actually, I heard three questions in there. One was what about the specific event on January 31st. I think we've talked about the actual measurements and that computation was made.

And then I heard about the N.R.C.'s annual report that by regulation Edison has to publish. The question with that is that doesn't seem very timely. How good is that? Every year, how is that being done?

I do think we're into the process of taking a look at that to see as an agency if there is anything we can do to speed that up. I don't want to speak and say more than I know. But I believe we had had that question before. I appreciate it.

The last point on maybe some radiation detectors off-site. I tell you one of -- I have been with the N.R.C. almost 25 years -- one of the hardest things we had to do is one of the hardest things I had to do was stand in front of you and tell you that there is little to no radiation being released from San Onofre. How are you going to believe me? You can't feel it. You can't taste it. You can't touch it. There is no way you can intuitively tell whether or not you can believe what I'm saying. I understand that.

And so one answer to that might be -- I don't know how we would get there -- but to have detectors off-site so that they can be available for you. I understand why you want that. Regulations don't require it, but there may be something, a solution there.

Q. Why not?

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you, Elmo. Rick.

Q. Rick (? 37:04). I live in Irvine, California. A couple of things. Realtime reporting over the internet, the emissions would be greatly appreciated by, I'm sure, by most of the people in this room.

My concerns about the tubes are: Mitsubishi has been making these stem generators for quite a long time. They have been put in all kinds of plants across the United States and there may be some design changes, but the basic geometry and flow in and flow out are probably pretty consistent amongst all these generators.

I can't imagine that their simulations are three to four times off and if so, how can that be? And they are that far off, how come we haven't had these problems in other places and why is it showing up now?

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you, Rick. Greg.

MR. WERNER: Yes. And actually, Mitsubishi has only had two generators that are currently designed and operating in the United States. One is -- well, both, they are at SONGS and Fort Calhoon outside of Omaha, Nebraska. Those steam generators are similarly designed, but they are much, much smaller.

And actually we had the same concern with wider terminal hydraulic model, underpredicted the flows. And again, that's another area that we were asking what caused -- what was it -- what was it in the model, what caused those thermal hydraulic conditions to be underpredicted.

We already asked for that also.

MR. DANIEL: I told you, we'll try to get back to you.

MR. HEADRICK: You cut me off.

MR. DANIEL: No. We've got to hear from everybody. We will try to get back to you, Gary. Just a minute.

Q. So you guys want timely information. Go to the internet. We have our own sources. If you would like them, you can come see me later.

Show of hands how many people here are here because they do not want any nuclear power?

We're here on a post mortem. A lot of these things are viewed upon delivery. I was listening to the earlier part of it. There were accelerometers that had been put off and showed that there could be damage to these things. If I was a clerk at Ralph's and I accepted a shipment like that, that would come out of my paycheck. Why isn't that going to come out of your paycheck?

How many of these -- you've actually answered this question. The models were off by three to four times. The confidence interval there is straight off the normal curve. Here is one about how long has an investigation of this sort had to have -- how many -- how long has it taken for an investigation of this sort to have come to a conclusion in the past.

MR. DANIEL: All right, Zeke. Thank you. Greg?

MR. WERNER: To answer the question about accelerometers, they were actually evaluated by SONGS. We just had a concerned as we looked at them to make sure they were properly evaluated.

They just weren't blown off. They were actually reviewed. We wanted to make sure that we understood, to make sure they were actually evaluated in accordance with their procedure.

The other thing about the model, again, we feel the same way as far as being underpredicted. We don't understand it and that's the situation we're in right now.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Who had some question about steam tubes. Stand up. Come on out here.

Q. Contractor North San Diego County. I got a question for Greg. These steam tubes, did I hear you right? The statistic were flying so fast. 128 tubes were tested, pressure tested?

MR. WERNER: 129.

Q. 129. Eight of them failed?


Q. Were they randomly tested throughout the entire amount of tubes?

MR. WERNER: No. Actually, if you go back, all approximately 40,000 tubes had inspections completed on them, and then numerous tubes were reinspected beyond what was required. The tubes that were selected for in situ pressure testing were actually based upon the ones that had the extensive tube wear.

Q. There was no random test of the entire 19,450 tubes in Unit 3?

MR. WERNER: That is correct, as far as the in situ pressure testing.

Q. With a failure rate of 6 percent, you might have 1,167 bad tubes.

MR. WERNER: I'll let Emmet help me out on this also. But the way the tubes are selected, again, we're looking once the (? 42:11) testing identified those tubes that would be susceptible to failure, they go and they test them. Because they don't have information to analytically say they're okay.

The idea is to go ahead and physically test them to make sure they will or will not hold. And of course, those eight tubes did not hold. And we suspected that a number of tubes would fail. That was not beyond what we did not expect to happen. We expected a number of tubes. Actually, I'm surprised more didn't fail.

Q. They only tested 148?

MR. DANIEL: Hang on.

MR. COLLINS: We need some explanation here. There is a misunderstanding what we know about the tubes. Emmet.

EMMET: Okay. Every time a plant conducts a steam generator inspection, one of the purpose is such to find tubes that are -- that are damaged beyond accepted (? 43:03). Those tubes are removed.

The second question, a steam generator inspection is intended to address is whether or not the utility was successful in maintaining adequate safety margins in all of the tubes during the last cycle of operation since the last inspection.

Normally, that assessment is performed through analysis of the inspection or any current test data of each of the tubes. They measure the depth and length of the cracks. They take into account measurement error. They utilize standard equations for predicting girth strength of tubing as a function of the length and depth of the flaw. And then they, based on all that information, they determine whether or not they have maintained factors of safety against failure consistent with the requirement.

These analyses tend to be very conservative because a lot of parameters uncertainty and so sometimes you predict through these analyses that tubes don't have sufficient strength. It is a very conservative analysis. In situ pressure test, then, are a way to then more realistically establish the amount of safety margin or confirm that you have the appropriate safety margin.

So based on your earlier analyses done by Southern California, any current inspection data, they identified a significant number of tubes where their analyses indicated they didn't have the appropriate margin, but these were conservative analyses. That's why we did the pressure test to determine for sure whether they had the appropriate margins.

The rest of the tubes that were not tested, it was very clear upon any current inspection data that they had the appropriate safety margins. So just the ones -- they just test the ones where there was some question as to whether or not they had appropriate the safety margin.

MR. WERNER: I'd like to add to that also. Even before the steam generators were brought here to site, did each steam generator, at least one time, if not multiple times, was pressurized, the entire steam generator to 125 percent of design pressure. So every steam generator tube was pressurized to 125 percent of design pressure.

Q. Which is how many P.S.I.?

A. No. Again the primary side, so we'll go approximately 2000 pounds, so add another, you know, about 2500 pounds, add another 500 pounds. So they're all pressurized to 2500 pounds. The entire steam generator -- it just wasn't the tubes. It was entire structure.

MR. COLLINS: I want to make sure -- this is a very important point that's made by the gentleman. Understand what's been done at the steam generators and what the condition of the tubes are today. I need the team to tell me. I wasn't on the team, so I could have a misunderstanding. 100 percent of the tubes, almost 20,000 of them, had the tube thickness measured, I think, for the full length, right?

So we know the thickness and that data on every tube, almost 20,000 on the steam generator, and it was only those that I think Emmet described that had the most wear that received the in situ pressure testing. We know what's out there with these tubes.

MR. WERNER: It's also important to understand that the tubes will wear during the normal operation. As part of the inspection program, they go and look at them to make sure even if they don't have a leak, they inspect so many tubes as required by tech specs. Again, the first outage they inspect 100 percent of all the tubes.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. Steam tubes.

Q. I'm Russ Teasley, local resident, Ocean Society. My question is did the N.R.C. or any of the investigators involve do specific analysis of the presence or absence of the stay cylinder, the primary stabilization element of the steam generator?

MR. WERNER: I'm going to let Joel answer that question. Joel Rivera Ortiz was on the team. He actually looked at the design changes associated with the --

MR. RIVERA: This is Joe Rivera. As part of the A.I.T., we looked at many of the design changes made from the regional to the new steam generators and we looked at how the stay cylinder was changed from the regional to the new steam generator. We reviewed the design basis of the steam generators and how the regional steam generators rely on the stay cylinder to performed their function, which formed the basis for operating licensing, operating license of the facility.

And we determined that the final safety analysis report of the facility did not rely specifically on the stay cylinder for the safety functions of the steam generators.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Joel. All right. I got to go to this lady in the green shirt before her arm falls off. You had a question about steam tubes?

Q. Thank you so much. This happened on January 31st, correct? Okay. What would the tubes' strength be on January 30th if we had had a serious seismic challenge to that plant? What would it take?

They certainly were damaged the day before, but they only broke on the 31st. Now maybe they were damaged on the 20th or the 21st. What do we know about how strong these were prior to? Aren't we just gambling here? Aren't we just taking our chances? We aren't a test facility here, a nuclear test facility. We're families. We're a community. We deserve better.

MR. WERNER: Thank you. I'd like to answer that question. Of course, the steam generators, design taking into consideration the seismic. As part of the in situ pressure testing, again, they selected those 129 tubes, as Emmet described.

All those tubes were pressurized -- attempted to pressurize up to 5200 P.S.I., which is, again, essentially almost three times higher than normal pressure. So three of the tubes failed around what we call the main steam line pressure, which was -- I think the test was 3300 P.S.I.

Those are the tubes that we were concerned with from a safety standpoint because they failed the lower pressure. And then the other tubes failed almost at or near the 5200 P.S.I. The rest of the tubes maintained the pressure and they had full strength and showed the integrity that they needed.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. Go ahead, Elmo.

MR. COLLINS: Let me reask that question. Do we think the tube degradation, the as-found condition of the tubes, had significant impact on the ability of the steam generators to withstand the seismic event. That might have been one of the questions I heard there.

MR. DANIEL: That's right.

MR. COLLINS: What -- did we look at that? Do we have an assessment on we think seismic qualification was significant on the impact? I hate to put the team on the spot. That's the question we got, I think.

MR. DANIEL: Go ahead, Emmet.

EMMET: Well --

MR. COLLINS: We had the team leader. Now we need the expert.

EMMET: The pressure tests -- the test procedure calls for considering not only the differential pressures that are at work during normal operation and during the accident conditions, the safety margin, but for the section that you're testing, section of the tube that you're testing, you must adjust the test pressure to the extent that loading from a seismic event or a local rare fractionly or some other hypothetical event, if that could affect the pressure capability of the tube, that should be reflected in the test pressure that the in situ pressure test was conducted.

It was my understanding during discussions that I had with personnel during the time that the tests were done that at the sections that they were testing that no -- that the loading conditions for size differential pressure did not impact the failure pressures.

MR. WERNER: Thank you. That's why I have people like him on the team. A lot smarter than I am.

MR. DANIEL: What does that mean? Okay. Clarification.

MR. COLLINS: Let me restate it. Emmet, you check me to make sure that I say this in plain language accurately.

Q. What magnitude are we talking about?

MR. COLLINS: It would be the ground acceleration for the design basis of earthquake at San Onofre so .16, but I think I heard Emmet say -- I'm looking at him carefully -- based on those stresses alone, the tubes would have retained their structure. Is that what you said? No? Emmet is going to clarify.

EMMET: The test pressure, test pressures at which the in situ test was conducted should reflect any seismic that has occurred.

I think maybe the point clarification was, you know, is how much does seismic affect the failure pressure for the conditions we have at San Onofre. It affected it -- it affected it in a negligible manner. In other words, it was differential pressure that controlled the structural margins for this situation.

Q. At what magnitude?

EMMET: Whatever magnitude they were required to consider. I don't know that -- that's not -- I don't know the answer to your question.

Q. That's another I don't know, better than the verbiage.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you, Emmet.

MR. COLLINS: I think we all understand that it's not the magnitude. It's the magnitude and how close it is to the plant. What the plant has to be built to is what is the maximum ground acceleration at this site, and then it's doubled. Then that acceleration is doubled. For San Onofre that's .67 Gs. That constitutes the design. That's the ground acceleration at the site that the plant has to withstand.

Q. Horizontal and vertical?

MR. DANIEL: Is that horizontal and vertical?

MR. WARNICK: There are component, horizontal and vertical. I don't know the numbers of exactly the horizontal and vertical, but yes that is considered.

Part 3

MR. DANIEL: Okay. We have a gentleman here who has a question about steam generators.

Q. Thank you. My name is Jeff Stimens (? spelling @0:008). I've got concerns concerning some of the changes regarding the generators and steam tubes. Previously, you stated that you did not -- that you only considered two changes to be under the 50.59 rule. This I'm confused by because it's my understanding that you guys removed the stay cylinder. This should have fallen under the 50.59 rule.

The change tube sheet, the thickness of the -- excuse me -- of the change tube sheet was changed. This should have fallen under the 50.59 rule. The tube alloy change. This was the only, as I understand it, thing that was clear to the N.R.C. that was changed that S.C.E. notified you guys of.

The additional tubes, 370 tubes per generator, this should have fallen under the 50.59 rule. The changed tube supports should have fallen under the 50.59 rule. The adflow restrictor should have fallen under the changed tube report. Any additional water bottle, the (? @ 1:10) water distribution ring, as well.

I would like an answer on each one of these as to why they did not fall under the 50.59 rule. Thank you.

MR. WERNER: I'll answer a general question. I'll let Joel answer the specifics for each of those items. Actually, all those items did fall under the 50.59 rule and they were evaluated in disposition. As we indicated, only two of those required licensed amendments.

Joel, do you want to come up and touch base on some of those other ones.

Q. That's just a statement. It's not an answer.

JOEL: Okay. Just for clarification, when we talk about 50.59, we're talking about Title 10 of the code Federal Regulation Section 50.59. And that section of the regulation establishes the threshold for regulatory review for planned changes that are applicable to that regulation.

And those changes that apply to that regulations are changes to the facility as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report. And that is why that something that is very, very important, is how that facility and the functions of those structured system and components are described in the FSAR, Final Safety Analysis Report because they form the basis for the operating license.

We look at those changes and we assess how the FSAR describe those sub components that you mentioned and how they affected the threshold of the steam generators.

As Greg said, we still need to review. We have more inspection to do in that area. But at this time we don't have any indications that those particular components were required to -- for a licensed amendment. The licensee did consider those in one other process.

This process is normally is two-step process: You do a screen where you identify all the changes that are affecting your facility, and then you move, does the screen mean, then you perform the evaluation under the criteria of 50.59. That process was done in the course of the industry process that we endorse through our regulatory guide.

MR. DANIEL: Hang on. Joel, stay right there for a second. Do you have a follow up question?

Q. I'm sorry. I just want to know from the audience. Does anybody understand really why any one of those things were changed?

MR. DANIEL: Hang on. We are not taking surveys. Thank you, anyway.

MR. WERNER: N.R.C. was aware of the changes that Southern California Edison was implementing.

Q. All of them? All of them?

MR. WERNER: Yes. Yes.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. All right. Question? Elmo, were you going to say something? Okay. What's your name, ma'am?

Q. Marion Pat. I'm a resident of Laguna Beach. I would like to know -- I've got two questions. The first one is when the steam generators, the four of them arrived from Japan, there were some identifiable problems at that point in time.

They were severe enough to even consider returning two of the generators to Japan. What were those problems? What was the fixed that was done on it and has it led to the 4-11 generators we are now dealing with at San Onofre.

My second question is: We are continually assured that the release of radiation there was very small. I would like to know when those generators are in the containment dome that is four-foot thick of concrete and re-bar, why didn't it contain this small amount of radiation? Why was it released into the atmosphere when it was within the containment dome?

MR. WERNER: I will go ahead and take the last question. I will let John Reynoso answer the first question. He actually did what we call review of the receipt inspection. We're not aware of any issues associated with what you talked about. I'll let John address that.


MR. REYNOSO: My name is John Reynoso. I am part of the A.I.T. and also the resident inspector there at San Onofre. The way I understand your question was the shipment of the steam generators was made. They never left Japan, the Unit 3 steam generators. They had issues with the divider plate issues. The arrival of the steam generators were delayed. Is that your understanding of that?

Q. Well, my understanding was that they were considering returning it. They were already here and there was some type of fix-it done and then they were installed. I just want to know whether the fix-its that took place have lead to where we are right now?

MR. REYNOSO: I'm not aware of any of those fixes that you talk about, but there were conditions that were found with Unit 3 steam generators where they were stored in Kobi, Japan. They took additional tests here on site with the Unit 2 steam generator and they were determined not to have the same conditions.

MR. WERNER: Now you could be talking about the issue that was identified in Japan on the Unit 3 steam generator where it had the divider plate well crack, that had to be repaired in Japan. That is a true statement, as far as they had to take extensive repair. I discussed that during the (? @ 6:56) portion. That was inherent team specifically looked at because that would be the biggest differences between the two steam generators.

They did have to cut off, if you remember the picture, the bottom of the bowl, the divider plate, because of heated cracks, had to rework the welds, re-weld the bowl back on and do pressure testing, as well as post-weld heat treatments associated with those activities.

But again, we did not find that those contributed at all to the steam generator tube wear.

MR. REYNOSO: Now our process is that we did a steam generator inspection specifically for replacement of steam generators. We would not allow Unit 2 steam generators to go in until we knew more about the Unit 3 conditions. That's what occurred. That may be what you have heard. But at no time did we install steam generators that did not meet our safety standard.

MR. WERNER: As far as your second part of your question about the leak, about why radiation leaked out is because the tube leaked. Once the tube leaked, as Greg Warnick described, the tubes actually separate the primary radioactive water from the secondary clean water. Once those tubes leaked, it leaks radioactive water into the secondary, which goes to steam turbin, which is outside containment.

One of the principal radiation barriers, primary reactor coolant system, which the tube is, actually leaked and allowed the greater activity go to the secondary side. That's why it leaked outside of containment because the steam goes under the turbin, which is on the secondary side, outside of containment.

Q. What you're saying is if there is a larger accident, a larger leak than what there was, the containment dome provides no protection?

MR. WERNER: If there is a tube rupture, you're absolutely correct. The containment dome does not. Like we said before, because of the ability to rapidly detect at low levels, the steam generators are isolated.

Again, the steam generators of the plant is designed for a tube rupture event. So there is a possibility and I don't believe -- I mean, Emmet might be able to tell me. I don't believe we've ever had what we call a steam generator tube design event where both -- what's called a double-ended sheer where essentially a chunk of the tube fails. You have leak from both the cold side and the hot side. I don't think that's ever occurred. I think we've had some failure of one tube, but not a double-ended shear. Is that right, Emmet?

EMMET: We haven't had any (? @ 9:30).

MR. WERNER: Not double-ended shear.

Q. Earthquake might do it.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you, Greg. You guys good? That's it?

MR. WERNER: Again, to clarify, the way that is combatted and prevented to minimize release of radioactivity is (? @9:50) warning identified, the operators identify, complete button up the steam generators that close the main steam isolation valves, depressurize it so the primary system is less than the secondary system, so it stops the leak.

There will be some radioactivity released, but it's minimized because of the actions that the operators take. Again, as discussed before, it's a combination of design, monitoring, as well as training of the operators to rapidly detect and isolate.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you. Sharon Hoffman, go ahead.

Q. (BY MS. HOFFMAN) Thank you. I have two technical questions and a logistics questions. The first question, I'm hearing repeatedly that this was unexpected and I'm wondering what the N.R.C. is doing to look at other replacement parts at other plants, whether they are steam generators, active pressure vessel, pumps, valves, whatever they may be where there was some kind of change.

Obviously, when you're allowing replacements, you're allowing changes in an attempt to make things better. Clearly, the simulations don't show what is going to happen. And we've seen that very vividly in San Onofre. And I'm wondering how you are applying that. Are you going back to look at every other application of this sort that you look for in the last 10, 20, 50 years. So that's my first technical question.

MR. DANIEL: How about the answer to that one first and then we'll get your second one? Okay?

Q. All right.

MR. DANIEL: All right.

MR. COLLINS: Make sure I understand the question. What's N.R.C. doing with respect to other significant design changes that they are implementing in nuclear power plants. I, specifically, for steam generators, the warnings we're getting from San Onofre, No. 1, we talked about we need to take a look at our processes, our inspection procedures and potentially, even our licensed amendment review process to see if we need to put more into that.

Also, there is one other plant, at least that I know of, that has steam generator replacements and we're looking at them as, well, with that licensee to understand the design. The real question is how do we know it meets its design objectives when a design is made like that. So that falls back to the engineering design review, independent verification, all those engineering principles that are at stake that we all rely on for safety, yet somehow our life's experience has shown us over the years that design sometimes is not what it's cracked up to be. That's what we got to watch out for at N.R.C. and make sure it does not have a significant impact on safety when those types of errors do occur.

MR. DANIEL: All right, Sharon. Your second question.

Q. I would just say it does have significant impact on safety and you might consider that precaution would be a prudent direction and you ought to stop making changes and stop letting engineering simulations project what we might have. My second technical question has to do with what about the possibility of cascading failures. It's been discussed that when the tube burst, it could have sent something flying into another tube. And people have discussed here possibilities of an earthquake happening at the same time.

Engineering failures do not happen in isolation and so I would ask the technical team to what degree they are considering what might have happened and what could happen in the future if that steam generator went flying out, hit another tube, hit another tube and next thing you know we have a much larger release of radiation.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you, Sharon.

MR. WERNER: Well, as part of the N.R.C. process we do a risk assessment and we'll look at the possibility of the multiple tubes failing. That's being conducted right now.

So again, we initially did an assessment for risk. That's why we lost the augmented inspection team. Risk did increase by quite a bit. So yes, we're concerned. It is a serious safety issue, like I said. We share some of the same concerns you do. We've got to understand what happened so that it can be prevented. Again, there is no decision that's been made. Clearly, if it had been, it be started up. At this stage, they have not done enough to demonstrate safety.

MR. DANIEL: Logistics question, final question?

Q. Yes. Logistics question is there was an opportunity to submit questions beforehand. We were told there will be opportunity to follow up with written questions. What are the mechanics for distributing answers to those questions and to any questions that you were not able to answer this evening to the public?

MR. WERNER: Again, I'll take that one. The feedback form that Rick talked about, actually I believe, is addressed to me, so I'll take those questions. And if you put on feedback form how you want to be contacted, preferably by e-mail, if that's okay or if you would like a different type of response, we can do that also. I will have the responsibility, as well as some of my team members, to help me address those issues, those questions.

MR. DANIEL: All right, Mr. Dan Hirst.

Q. (BY MR. HIRST) I have two questions. I would like to preface it by trying to say what I think many people here are feeling. There is tremendous skepticism on the part of many of us about both Edison and the N.R.C. and their very cozy apparent relationship.

We wouldn't be here today if Edison had told the N.R.C. these were significant design changes and we should go through a licensed amendment process, that the public can be part of the review. We wouldn't be here today if N.R.C. had said we are going to do a licensed amendment with a full public hearing and with full review. In light of that long history of things like five years of (? @ 16:38) fabrication fire, four years of diesel generators without batteries attached, and so forth, and the N.R.C. doing essentially nothing.

My first question to you is: Will the N.R.C., before A decision is made on whether or not to permit restart of either unit, hold a formal, full adjudicatory, evidentiary hearing in which parties, not just Edison and the N.R.C. participate, but whereby experts who are critical of both of you testify with cross examination, discovery and a full evaluation of whether it is safe to restart.

My question, directly on point about your steam generators and determination that you want to be transparent. I, for three months, along with numerous members of the press, have been trying to get some numbers out of N.R.C. And I would like you to give us those numbers today.

In early February N.R.C. spokesman Victor Drake (? @ 17:30 ) said that they had inspected only one of the four steam generators that one being Unit 2, only 80 percent of it had found somewhere in the vicinity of 900 tubes that had wear, wear more than 10 percent. Through months we have been asking how many tubes have you found with wear and we've been frankly given the run around.

We have just been told by Edison we only found two tubes of trouble in Unit 2. We know that's not true because in early February you had nearly 900. Would you tell us today how many tubes in Unit 2, how many tubes in Unit 3 have wear of greater than 10 percent and also how many tubes in Unit 2 and Unit 3 have shown any indication of wear?

Those are the two questions. Will you permit an adjudicatory, evidentiary hearing on the safety of restart before making that decision?

MR. DANIEL: All right.

Q. (BY MR. HIRST): Secondly, how many bad tubes are there in total?

MR. WERNER: The tube question, I'd have to ask Emmet for the exact count. I don't even know if he has the exact count. We do have that information. That's part of our inspection activity. But there are a significant number of tubes that had wear indications. The ones we've talked about Unit 2 were the two that had tube-to-tube wear. That is where the large concern.

There were other issues on the other generators on Unit 2 have to do with any Unit 3 retainer bar, which I also discussed. Those were measured and plugged to address that issue.

As far as the specifics, I don't have the raw data in front of me. I can't remember all of that information.

Q. Where will you publish that information?

MR. WERNER: We will publish some of the information in the inspection report. I don't know if we will go to that level of detail, down to 10 percent wear.

Q. Why not? Why not?

MR. DANIEL: Hang on, folks. Hang on.

MR. COLLINS: Mr. Hirst, I just don't think -- there's almost 20,000 tubes. That data we don't have at our fingerprints. We have that information. We just don't have it here to relate it to you tonight. And I'd like to take away a commitment. What I'm going to offer is see if we can find away to get that data and put it on our website and make it publicly available so you can take a look at the info. Would that be acceptable to you?

Q. No. Numbers in rough terms, do you have a (? @ 20:22) Unit 2?

MR. DANIEL: Listen, how about this. He committed to putting the information on public website so that it's publicly available. Rather than him approximating, how about he doesn't -- he's made a commitment to do that. All right. Hang on?

Q. Is this a cover up?

MR. DEITRICH: Thank you for the question. We will get you the specific numbers. Just a second. I will share the percentages with you tonight. Please keep in mind, we already mentioned that we measure on each tube, on each of the 9727 tubes on each steam generator, we look for -- there could be several wear indications as these tubes move through the tube support links. Rough numbers, rough percentages on Unit 3, nine percent of the tubes in the Unit 3 steam generators, 19,454 tubes in the Unit 3 steam generators, nine percent of them showed wear with greater than 10 percent through wall indications. Nine percent.

On Unit 2, 12 percent of the tubes showed wear greater than 10 percent through wall indication. Let me share with you that compared to other steam generators in the industry, those numbers by themselves are not alarming.

Q. That's alarming.

MR. DEITRICH: What is alarming and the reason we are here tonight is because of the unexpected tube-to-tube wear. We will get you the specific information with that, with those numbers. On Unit 3, we saw 326 tubes, with tube-to-tube wear, greater than 10 percent through wall.

On Unit 2, we saw two tubes with the unexpected tube-to-tube wear greater than 10 percent through wall. So we will get the information out to you. I will get it to you, Mr. Hirst. But for tonight, nine percent of the tubes on Unit 3 with greater than 10 percent through wall wear. On unit 2, 12 percent of the tubes with greater than 10 percent through wall wear.

Q. (BY MR. HIRST:) Full power plugging limit is eight percent. If those tubes continue to wear, are you restarting over your plugging limits?

Second point, you say that this is normal in Unit 2. Victor Drake from N.R.C. is quoted in the paper as early February saying for Unit 2, tube wear we are finding so much of is very unusual.

That's why you need an evidentiary hearing, where not as, but independent expert, before independent body. I'd like an answer to the question as to whether we will get that hearing.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you. Thank you for your question. We are going to try to get an answer.

MR. COLLINS: Tonight is the augmented inspection team exit meeting. I think if you have been watching N.R.C., you understand our processes. You might even know better than I do, for all I know.

You know that inspection process does not provide opportunity for hearing. I'm not defending that. I'm just being straight forward with you to let you know. That is the process we're in and we do intend to follow our processes.

I will go on further to say that though because we are so early on in understanding what the exact resolution of this problem will be, I cannot say we will have a hearing and I can't say we will not have a hearing. It's possible when we consider the actions that need to be taken by Edison that it will drive us into the hearing process, so I just don't know the answer tonight. The inspection process does not send us there.

Q. One quick comment. The regional administrator, the region in which San Onofre exists, there is a large number of people you are speaking for, all you have to do is say you will go back and recommend there be a full evidentiary hearing. Will you do that?

MR. COLLINS: I have been back to my superiors and with this question and we are in collaboration on whether or not such a hearing is possible. Thank you.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Okay. Brian. Brian Crosby.

Q. (BY MR. CROSBY:) First of all, thank you for the opportunity to have these sort of discussions. It's my understanding that there is a nuclear plant in Ohio Davis-Besse that has recently discovered a similar pinhole leak in that facility.

My question is to the N.R.C., what effects will this have on the overall nuclear -- the overall nuclear industry.

And secondly, just another quick question is when this facility comes back up, is there a specific percentage capacity that it will be operating at and if so -- I know you don't want to give specific time lines, but can we expect maybe a testing period and then shut down and full-blown -- bad choice of words -- full capacity startup?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Brian.

MR. WERNER: I'll do Davis-Besse last. Again, no decision has been made for restart and those decisions haven't been finalized. I can't speculate on what the power would be. There will be, if you look at the confirmatory action letter, talks about a mid cycle outage. When we say mid cycle, that could be two months, that could be three months, that could be four months. Again, that will have to be part of the action going forward. Again, no decision has been made on start up.

As far as Davis-Besse, I'm not aware of that, but I know we do -- actually, Emmet might be able to answer that question better than I. We are actually -- his office is working on information notice that talks about some other recent issues with steam generators.

So again, just to reemphasize where does occurring steam generators, the idea is not to have unexpected wear and make sure when you do have wear, you monitor it so it doesn't cause an issue of wear heavily. That's why there is an inspection program. It is a mechanical system. You do get wear.

Emmet, do you know specifically about Davis-Besse?

EMMET: Davis-Besse, no.

MR. WERNER: Okay. Did you hear that? Emmet is not aware what's going on with Davis-Besse. Sorry. Can't answer that. Again, there are several -- I want to say three or four sites, that have had recent steam generator tube issues that are being -- an information notice that described what occurred is being put out in industry.

MR. DANIEL: Mr. Campbell, do you have a question about steam tubes?

Q. (BY MR. CAMPBLELL): First of all, I want to say that Southern California Edison is a privately owned company and if they made a decision that didn't produce the most profits for their shareholders, then they would be removed.

MR. DANIEL: Is this about steam tubes, though?

Q. It's getting there.

MR. DANIEL: All right.

Q. This guy, Salzman -- I went to the (? @ 28:20) seismic hearings in the fall of 1980. Salzman headed the three-man atomic safety and licensing appeals board panel, note that safety and licensing are on the same board. They have approved all licenses, to my knowledge, and to my knowledge, haven't granted any upheavals. Then Chairman Salzman got appointed to a federal judgeship shortly before he ruled Diablo was seismically safe, you can rest assured.

Then the Dietrich fellow with Edison, I guess, he mentioned that over the longer term life of the plant, as if it's an assumption that we're going fire it up and have a longer life of plant, and introduced the fellow prior to re-start, as if that's the obvious conclusion of that where this process is heading.

And regarding the steam generator tubes, there is supposed to be difference in the vibration bars between Units 2 and 3. Now Edison installed one of the reactor vessels 180 degrees backwards, discovered some months later, and decided to rewire the control room and turn other things around to fit the backward reactor.

Is the difference in the tube wear possibly related to one of the reactor vessels being installed 180 degrees backward, or what accounts for the difference? Thank you.

MR. WERNER: I'm sorry. I never heard about a 180 degree backward reactor vessel. Can't comment on that.

Q. At the San Clemente hearing I asked the question -- I mentioned that and the guy said, "Well, it is true one of the reactors had the out-of-design orientation." It is not a backward reactor. It's an out-of-design orientation. Anyway, talk to the guy that answered that question in San Clemente.

MR. DANIEL: We'll look into that. Okay.

MR. COLLINS: At the risk of speaking for the team, I don't think that's been identified as one of the causes. The installed configuration of the steam generators was compared and looked at between Units 2 and 3 and they didn't identify any configuration differences in the units, the likely greater prospective cause, I think for the issue.

Q. (BY MR. FALCHI:) Thank you for answering the questions as best as you can tonight. There was one that was asked about the damage that was done to the steam generators and so forth, and how that might be affected by the level of seismic activity that could be expected in California, just as it was expected in Japan when they were planning for a 7.0 quake and had 9.0 quake.

We had a 4.2 one last week in Whittier. That's not too far from here and there is big one expected sometime in the future, whether it happens precisely in San Onofre or nearby, it will affect all the steam generators and all that other fragile equipment here that will effect the lives of 8 million people. Don't you know what capacity earthquake in this area this plant is built for?

MR. WERNER: As Elmo indicated earlier, yes. It is based on ground acceleration, not magnitude. They are somewhat related, but not related. Steam generator tubes, again, during initial design, seismic is taken into consideration. That's again, why the tubes are tested to insure that they can maintain tube integrity through all accident condition situations.

MR. COLLINS: I'll add to that answer. The original licensing of the plant the seismic hazard was established and it did take into consideration faults and potential movement of the faults and the energy in the faults, which would translate into the magnitude earthquake.

Then you got to build the plant to something. How would that translate over what distance, what's the soil, what are the characteristics of that to translate that energy to ground acceleration and decide. That's what determined the .67 G acceleration that the site is designed for.

Then in addition to that, though, because of the accident in Japan, N.R.C. right now is requiring all nuclear power plant licensees to go back and reestablish that seismic hazard characterization based on the best, the latest and maybe even have to go get some new information about the seismic hazard, so we can make sure we understand the hazard, make sure the plant is built strong enough to protect against it.

It's a major important question here in Southern California that we get this right. Thank you.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you.

Q. (BY MS. GREENBERG:) Lenore Greenberg. It's become obvious to everybody here that these tubes are horrendously dangerous, unreliable, unpredictable and represent a tremendous threat to our lives and the lives of our families. I'm not so sure about whether safety is the first consideration here, especially for Edison. I think that profit is.

When it comes to these tubes, one of the articles in the newspaper, I know this is some of the propaganda of Edison, was they were talking -- already started to mention it -- they were talking about opening this facility 50 percent, or some level like that. What I want to know from the N.R.C. people is would that make those tubes safe?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. WERNER: Well, again, no decision has been made for restart. We don't know what that level of power is going to be. Have to be evaluated. The decision could be no restart or the decision could be restart. That hasn't been made. I want to make things clear. We don't know what power level it will be. Clearly if they reduce power, there will be reduction in the steam flow velocity we are talking about, but again, that's not the only thing that's causing the issue with the vibration. So there's multiple causes and multiple corrective actions that have been to be taken.

Again, we are waiting to see what they are before we can make a safety decision because we can't make it yet. Again, if it was right now if you ask me right now, again, that's why they are shut down. Right now it's not safe.

Q. I realize you would not know the level, the percentage it would be open. Would any reduction make it safe? That's what's I'm asking.

MR. WERNER: Again, without looking at multiple corrective action, I can't answer that question. If it was right now no other changes my inclination would be no. Again, don't have information as far as additional corrective actions.

MR. DANIEL: Richard Mc Phearson?

Q. (BY MR. MCPHEARSON): Earlier in talking about, I think, it was Emmet that answered the question. There are some people here that are actually trying to understand everything that's said. And the term was used LOCA verification pressure weight.

Well, those sort of things I understand a little bit, but some of the people around go huh? When you're giving the technical answer to something, please try to explain yourself in something that people can understand. When you talk about LOCA, a lot of us have lived with those for four years. A lot of people here that are serious people haven't and they would like to know what things like that mean. Thank you. And thank you to the people that work at SONGS for what you do. You do a great job.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. COLLINS: Thank you for your comment. We live and work in this business every day. Sometimes these things just slip out of our mouth. We don't even really realize we're not using plain language. We appreciate your patience and your listening and your understanding tonight. And we do try to convey in language you can understand. Thank you.

MR. WERNER: LOCA is loss in cooling accident.

Q. Just briefly, I wonder before Edison tries to fix these -- looking like huge problems -- before rate payers get asked to pay for this, can you provide an honest cost comparison with, say, solar panels, solar energy or alternative energy?

MR. DANIEL: That might be a little off the subject, ma'am.

Q. Not really.

MR. DANIEL: That's something -- I know it may not be for folks here tonight. We are on certain topic. That's a question that might be forwarded --

Q. Look at benefits of cost and of repairing it, versus fixed this problems. Problem you're talking about.


Q. Talk about pay for it.

MR. DANIEL: All right.

Q. How much is it going to cost them? Is there a better alternative?

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you.

Q. Del Mar, close neighbor of San Onofre. In the newspaper -- to answer your question about alternatives, we don't need any alternatives because we have 40 percent surplus in every alphabet soup government agency. Electric grid operator said we have plenty of power. We will not have a blackouts this summer. To answer that question.

That raises the other question: Why do we need to take this risk, maybe that's off topic. Anyway, in 2009 when they installed -- you're holding that. I don't need to hold your hand -- when they installed the first generator there was a quote in the newspaper, "The new steam generator is designed to last longer," said manager Mike Warden, manager of the steam generator replacement project. "They are designed for 40 years," he said. "We expect we'll actually be able get 60 years out of it. Better materials, better designs. You learn over the course of the year what works well and what doesn't and you try to build that into the next generation. Then he has special team N.R.C inspectors, specialists in steam generators.

I'll thinking about this quote, as I'm listing to all these expert that we brought in and all the different ones that Edison said bringing in, and I have a lot of respect for your skills and everything, but there's a limit and there's still a risk.

There's probabilities and you're talking about earthquakes. Earthquake is a just a friggin guess, you know. They come on suddenly. So I'm listening to this, experts, what I see what happened radiation leak after a year, we were just lucky it wasn't a bigger accident.

Why are we taking these risks for energy we don't need? That's the bottom line. Why would you boil water with something that can destroy California, destroy our food supply. Also get to your house in Texas. Why take a risk for energy we don't need? I know you're working hard and putting a lot of time on this. I appreciate all of your hard work. I feel like Alice in Wonderland here dropped some hole. This is just craziness.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Donna. Elmo?

MR. COLLINS: I think this -- I really appreciate your sentiment. I can convey to you the nuclear regulatory commission. We are established by law. We have a certain job to do. We are not advocates or opponents of nuclear energy to generate electricity. What the law charges us to do is, if it is going to be done, if that decision is made, and it's implemented, to make sure it's done safely.

We're set up as an independent agency. That was for a reason, because back in 1975, the wisdom of Congress said we don't want safety question, that there really be compromise to the extent it can.

Once that policy decision is made and laws are put in place, you know, the agency is then charged to go out and carry that. That's where we're at today. We've got to make sure the regulations are met. I think even beyond that, I worked with licensee enough to know, they're working to reduce the risk. Your question is why accept the risk using this method of generating electricity. That's a decision that is not mine to make. Mine is to follow the law. I understand your concern.

Q. On the safety issue, it is a safety issues dealing with simulations.

MR. COLLINS: Exactly. I agree with you.

Q. (unable to hear @ (41:460) Hazard.

MR. COLLINS: That was a key factor, we think, from the steam and that issue has to be understood more fully and resolved before the unit is returned to power.

Q. Can it be resolved?

MR. COLLINS: That resolution has not been given to me. It is a difficult technical issue, I would offer to you or the answer already been evident. They are not. A lot of analysis, a lot of evaluation is left to be done before the answer is produced. We will take a look at it when we get it.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Elmo. We had a question clarification for (? @ 42:52)

Q. Earlier in the evening there was reference to decommissioning of Unit 1 and what happens to the old generator. The comment was because it has more radioactivity, it's sent to another facility.

I was on the California Coastal Commission when Unit 1 was decommissioned and a lot of time was spent on how to get this generator on a raft, on a barge to go around the tip of South America to go to the Carolinas. I found out after five hours on the web and asking probably 10 people from Edison where it was. They all assumed that it ended up in the Carolinas. It's buried on site. Earlier reference was that because these are more radioactive, they should be moved.

MR. WARNICK: There is a misunderstanding. That is not what I said. I was not talking about Unit 1. I was talking about Units 2 and 3 replacement, the old steam generators. Unit 2 and 3 is what I was talking about. This is all happened within the last couple of years. I'm not talking about Unit 1, something that happened years ago.

Q. Wasn't that long ago. The question comes out and question, I think, is communication between Southern California Edison and the N.R.C. I wondered if you're aware of the fact that it was buried on site.

MR. WARNICK: It's actually not buried. It's in a vessel above ground. I see it every day.

Q. Okay. Why did you spend -- why did Edison go to the trouble of these hearings and lobby the way they did to move this, if, in fact, it was all right to leave it on site? What happened that you didn't follow through with the approvals that were granted?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. WARNICK: It was years before my time.

MR. DANIEL: Peter?

MR. DIETRICH: The question, thank you for bringing it up. We're conflicting issues. What you are speaking about is the Unit 1 reactor vessel, which is from the original Unit 1 reactor. There is only one of those. It is still located on site on San Onofre. We are now working with shipping specialists for being able to secure a safe and insured and viable shipping alternative. That work continues.

We have not concluded, nor is it our plans to leave that reactor vessel on site. But we have run into over the years numerous problems with proposed manners of shipping that the original Unit 1 reactor vessel. That is what the issue that you're bringing up specifically relates to. We are working quite diligently to continue move that reactor vessel to its final storage location.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Peter. Going to go to the back here. Theses poor folks back here being neglected all night. I was only back here once. Why don't you give us your name?

Q. Chris. My question is two. I heard different questions on the restart. My question N.R.C. discuss Unit 2 is separate from Unit 3 as far as restart? Are you separating that process? And then the second question is: Will you allow temporary fixes? I heard a little bit of language on long-term solutions versus the N.R.C. saying we are looking at final solution. What's N.R.C.'s perspective on both the long term and short term and what's the N.R.C.'s perspective on Unit 2 versus Unit 3?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. WERNER: I'll take that question. Actually, the confirmatory action letter does have different actions for Unit 2 and Unit 3. That was based upon tube degradation different. The wear was very significant in Unit 3 compared to Unit 2. There are actions that are different.

Now it is important, if you look at the confirmatory action letter, one of the steps was to actually determine what happened in Unit 3 and take actions to make sure that same mechanism doesn't show up on Unit 2. Does that answer your question there?

Q. Are we going to see a resolution on Unit 2 or are we going to see a resolution on Unit 3 or are they going to happen at the same exact time?

MR. WERNER: We anticipate -- I will let Southern California Edison answer that also. We anticipate them come in with Unit 2 first and then Unit 3, but, again, that hasn't been finalized. It could changed. I don't know what the final would be. We anticipate Unit 2 before Unit 3 because of the severity on Unit 3.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

Q. (BY MR. KIRSHENER) Good evening. My name is Jeremy Kirshener. I'm the emergency services coordinator for the City of Dana Point, located right next door to San Juan Capistrano. I'd just like to say a couple of things really quick.

First, thank you to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for all the inspection process that's been going on with the steam generators and the routine inspections that happen at San Onofre every day.

Also, I'd like to just briefly mention the communication that we have as the City of Dana Point between Southern California Edison.

On numerous occasions, Mr. Deitrich and his staff have met with our City management, our elected officials, our emergency staff to update on us what's going on throughout steam generator process and this whole issue. And we have routine discussions with other San Onofre staff regarding what's going on with the plant, status of inspections, and everything going on currently. That's not something that's just happened in the last few months or since January. Those discussions have been ongoing since the city's incorporation in 1989 and even before that with the other jurisdictions.

From our position, the City of Dana Point, we're prepared to respond to any type of emergency, whether it's San Onofre or not, whether the plant is operating or not. We hope that you would all do the same. Thank you all for being here tonight.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

Q. My name is (unable to hear @ 49:09). I'm naturalized citizen. I'm born and raised in Japan. I have a couple of questions.

You mentioned that steam amount was released 5.2 millirems I'm not familiar with how categorize the steam. Could you please explain to me about the amount, of radiation in severts?

MR. WARNICK: The number that I mentioned was 5.2 times 10 to the minus 5. So that's .000052 millirem. I can't in my head do the conversion to severts. I have a little conversion on my phone that I use. I apologize. Here in the U.S., we use terms of rem and millirem and (? @ 50:10).

MR. DANIEL: 5.2 times 10 minus 5?

MR. WARNICK: That's right. If you want to get with me after, I can put it into my little --

Q. That was severts, right. The answer severt. MR. WARNICK: Millrem.

Q. I understand millirems.

MR. WARNICK: That's the unit that we use in the United States to assess radiation exposure to humans.

Q. Okay. Secondly, I hope I can find out the level in severt (? ). I'm familiar with?


Part 4 (Audio Only)

MR. DANIEL: Yes, the allowed amount.

MR. WERNER: Essentially the regulatory limits, 100 millirem, but there's lower limits. I want to say it's 5 -- forgive me. I don't remember the exact number. I believe it's 5 millirem for gas and 3 for liquid. I could have it backwards. Again, very low level. That's for a year. And going from memory, the effluent that was released last year from SONGS was no more than a 10th of a millirem to a member of the public. So that would be 0.1 millirem. That's probably too high by a factor of 10 approximately.

So 0.1 millirem was what was released, both gas and effluent from SONGS last year. I could be off a little bit. Pretty close to that value.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Final question here.

MR. WARNICK: Let me just interject. To make sure we get your response back to that conversion, if you could fill out a feedback form and ask your question that will insure that we can get directly back to you.

Q. Steam, what kind of radio isotopes were (? unable to hear @ 1:23)?

MR. WERNER: It's again, without looking at specifics, I think it's argon gas. And iodine. Thank you.

A. Predominant radio nuclei released were argon 41, Xena 133, Xena 136. I'm sorry. 135, and then there was some iodine components to noble gas.

MR. DANIEL: Yes, sir. What's your name?

Q. (BY MR. JOHNSTON:) Al Johnston, San Diego. You talk about tube wear greater than 10 percent. What's the upper limit on tube degradation that you're going to accept before you say it's bad and how do you monitor wear, tube wear and vibration while the unit is running?

MR. WERNER: On the tube plugging is limited to 35 percent once you reach that level it has to be plugged. Again, that's a simplistic answer. When they do steam generator inspections before they restart they have to go ahead and do analysis to show that that won't be reached before the next outage because, again, if it happens, it's not acceptable per specifications. They have to go ahead and make an analysis to show that they won't have that much wear before the next outage. I'm sorry. What was your last question?

Q. (BY MR. JOHNSTON:) Are they able to evaluate degradation and amount of vibration while the unit is running?

MR. WERNER: Actually, there is no current way right now that you can evaluate vibration with the unit is running. It's actually being looked at as a potential method in the future.

They are doing it on boiling water reactors, which is a different type of reactor. Different -- a little slightly environment, not as harsh, but it doesn't last for very long because it is a very harsh environment. You can't go stick it on the tubes because you may create an issue. If that detector was to fall off, it can actually cause tube wear and tube damage and cause a leak. There are issues that have to be explored.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Mr. Cruz has a question.

Q. (BY MR. CRUZ:) Yes. Had there been no unexpected tube-to-tube degradation and were there not to be some major local seismic event and were everything to go as projected, what would have been the minimum extended life expectancy of this plant?

I ask this to get some idea of whether Southern Cal Edison has a sound business plan.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. WERNER: I'm not sure I totally understand your question, but the plant was originally designed for 40 years.

Q. (BY MR. CRUZ:) I was thinking about approximately 700 billion dollars already spent on their renewed and upgrading of the plant. On the additional costs, which will come from modifying the flaws have been found and about the approximate loss of one billion dollars a day from lost revenue. These tubes have quite an expensive bottom line.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Mr. Cruz. Next question.

Q. Given -- my understanding is that the plant originally on its 40-year licensing agreement would end in 2014; is that correct?

MR. (? 5:17) 2022. Essentially 10 years.

Q. Okay. So how did -- this is my first question: How did the Nuclear Regulatory Commission find it acceptable to have, as I understand it, two 600 million dollar steam generators approved for a plant that only had 10 years left in the hopes that it would last 40 to 60 years, given that my understanding is that any machinery -- sort of a car, think of it as a car, where if you don't do any tune-ups on a car, beautiful muscle car that was built in, say, the '60's and then you turn around and say, "I think it's a time for a tune-up," that car doesn't -- everyone probably will know it, if they don't already -- knows that that car doesn't adjust well to that tune-up and it never runs quite the same again.

I'm wondering, again, how the N.R.C. approved new steam generators that will last 40 to 60 years when the licensing only goes for another 10?

MR. WERNER: Again, that's not considered as part of what the N.R.C. looks at as far as the economic life and it's based upon safety. The old generators did have some issues. They couldn't reach full power and the utility decided to go ahead and upgrade. So we looked at it, again, from safety perspective, not from an economic perspective.

MR. DANIEL: Last question from this lady.

Q. I have a question about the exact design change and since I have to include it in my second question, I want to know whether the U design was changed to a V design and if any of these concerns were brought up by the whistle blower that was hushed recently by the Southern California Edison company?

MR. WERNER: Actually, the steam generators -- Emmet might be able to help me -- the original steam generators had what they call a square bend. The new steam generators have you a U bend, actually shaped like a U. The other ones were more a square type arrangement.

As far as the whistle blower, I'm not aware of -- you have to give me a little more details. I'm not aware of a whistle blower.

Q. In the past a while back, there was a whistle blower who came to light and I don't know what he whistle blew. I'm wondering if those concerns were generated in way on any of these issues?

MR. WERNER: I don't have any knowledge of the individual that you're talking about or what the concern was. Sorry.

MR. COLLINS: I would add, by policy and I think for good reason when people bring us concerns, we protect their identity it and that process to the maximum extent we can. If we did know of it, I don't think I would be able to convey that to you in that way that might connect and confirm if someone brought us concerns.

Q. Thank you. I'm Marten Magda (? sp @ 8:32). I appreciate, Mr. Collins, you being here, again. I did hear you last September. That's when I got most frightened because you said 7-0 protection against earthquake was adequate.

Now that we look at this steam generator problem and you're telling us that it's only guaranteed at 7.0 earthquake, and we look at the way in which I hear the language sometimes "I think" or "it's my understanding," and I remember Tony Eisman standing there giving us a quote of a man who said, "These are going to be the best. They will be wonderful." And the response from one of you was "Well, that was before my time." My question is who is ultimately accountable?

Who's name goes on this forever that we can all say, "This name, this person said that these were safe," because there is not a person in this room that has confidence in people with the Nuclear Regulatory system or Edison. The language -- I already knew when you said tube-to-tube you were hiding something. You do this to protect yourselves and I guess make us feel comfortable. None of us feel comfortable.

The latest concern of these steam generators -- not just earthquake can ruin things. We haven't even talked about fire storm that could come through 140 homes in Laguna Beach that every September we go against fire storms. That could put all the men working and women working at San Onofre at stake. And what if we have at the same time steam generator pipes that start crack, what are -- what is your back up for all of these possible contingency and who ends up -- whose name goes on this for the history of the world if we go to Fukushima? Whose name is saying this is safe?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. COLLINS: In was a lot in your question. I think we've already talked about seismic. Size of the earthquake, I think, is translated in ground motion at the site. That's what it's designed for. We are requiring all licensee to reasses that seismic with the latest scientific information that's available and updated if necessary.

More work to be done on seismic to make sure that we have a facility that's built the way it needs to be built. With respect to whose name goes on -- Southern California Edison. That is the name on the license. They are the ones that primarily take the responsibility for safety to make sure the regulations are met, to make sure that the facility is operated and supposed to be operated and for this specific issue, you know, to make sure that when steam generators are changed that it's properly, design objectives are met.

That's my job as a federal regulator and we conduct inspection program and assessment programs to check that, to check that along the way so within the law and within our procedures and our guidelines.

The name on the license bears responsibility for safety.

MR. DANIEL: All right. Thank you, Elmo. Charles has a question about the steam generator.

Q. (BY MR. MURRY:) It's Charles Michael Murray from Laguna Beach. Am I understanding that the new generators that have gone in on Unit 3 are unique, that there is one that is kind of similar somewhere else, but very unique and there isn't anything identical on the planet that we can compare and contrast to. So the situation is unique and we are being exposed to this. Am I understanding this correctly?

MR. WERNER: You're correct these generators are the only type of generators in the world. There are similar generators, Palo Verde, Waterford, Fort Calhoon, Saint Lucy. Again, these specific generators designed by Mitsubishi, these are unique generators, the size wise.

Q. (BY MR. MURRAY:) If that's the case, how do they get approved to be placed in an environment with 8 million people?

MR. WERNER: Again, as we discussed earlier they were -- they did go through the 50-59 review process and we are still reviewing that process. At this time we have not identified anything that would have required a license amendment, other than those two items I talked about earlier. They did go through a license amendment review.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

Q. (BY MR. GENE STONE) Gene Stone, Residents Organized for a Safe Environment. Would like to ask that before the plant is restarted, that a cost analysis be done by the California Public Utility Commission to determine whether it is cost effective for the citizens to have the plant reopen and within that investigation, it should be considered the twice through cooling that is required by state law, but both nuclear power plants in California are only doing once through cooling and have been given three-year extension because they say it is too expensive to do. But the law is -- and they have closed coal fire plants for this and gas fire plants for this once through cooling. Why shouldn't Southern California Edison and this be considered in the cost analysis?

MR. COLLINS: If I understand your question, it's about -- you requested some information be provided to the California Public Utilities Commission and cost, the implementation of the cooling that's employed. I don't know if anyone from Edison would want to tackle. I'm not cognizant the N.R.C does not have purview over the interactions of the Southern California Utilities Commission. I guess I'm unable to be responsive to your request.

MR. DANIEL: All right, folks. It's getting a little late and I promised one gentleman that I would get back to him when we finished, so I'm going to do that. I'm not done yet.

Q. (BY GARY): Thank you very much. There's been some great questions asked tonight, much more analytical. I tend to be more going with analogy of the intervention. I thought it was important and I just want to finish up my final conclusion.

It has been mentioned a little bit tonight and I know there's some questions, gray areas, jurisdictions. It's a real human question and I just want to finish my thought.

It has been a rewarding game for some and we are grateful, especially considering Japan's state, that we have not lost everything in one bad bet. Nature holds the wild card where anything is possible. So far she has been kind to us.

We are here to tell you it is time to take your wings and go home. Don't even ask to place one more bet. That will only confirm your gambling disorder and co-dependent relationship.

This is the time for introspection and reconciliation. We look forward to getting to a place where everybody wins, embracing the future with the healthy renewed perspective. Thank you.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Gary. Folks we are going to take three more questions and then I'm going to ask that you submit any remaining questions on those feedback forms that I spoke of earlier they. Are out in the lobby on the table. We are going to have three last questions and we are going to wrap it up for the night. Do you want to stand.

Q. (BY MS. CUMMINGS:) My name is Tara Cummings. I'm a pediatric nurse. One of the things that has been in the news lately is that because of new information about the external and internal radiation exposures to children, the new recommendations now are that they do not receive as many or as intensive imaging because they found that they increase the amount of leukemia and brain tumors in these children by seven times.

We have a number of children that live close to San Onofre. There is a direct proportional increased risk for Leukemia and other things and the amount of time living near a nuclear reactor. We have lots of different radiation exposures that continue to fall upon us. Some are being released by San Onofre. Some are coming over through the jet stream from Fukushima. Some of it has been here since the nuclear testing that went on in the '50's.

Who is adding up the total exposure for our area? Some issues these radio isotopes can stay lethal, harmful for hundreds of thousands of years. Who is adding up the total and measuring the total amount of exposure in our population and determining what little at risk and how are the new information -- what do you call it? The learnings -- the new learnings about the true risks to human life being implicated into the testing that's being brought done and the regulations that are being used to determine the risk assessment on this nuclear power plant?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you.

MR. WERNER: I share your concerns about children with radiation. I have a six-year-old. Actually, up until about a year and a half or two years ago, I didn't realize how much radiation CAT scan, that's the stage you're talking about the other day.

For your perspective, a CAT scan, whole body CAT scan gets between 2,000 to 5,000 millirem for each whole body CAT scan. Again, for a child that has to be weighed, that's something you talk to the medical doctor to see if benefit outweighs the risk. You're actually correct. As compared to what the plant released last year, like I said, it was around .1, 0.1 millirem versus 2,000 to 5,000 millirem. As Greg indicated, naturaly occurring radiation is about 3600 -- 360 millirem, and then from other sources about 600, 650 millirem per year.

Q. (?Inaudible @ 20:05) Fukushima and what if the tsunami starts spinning more our way.

MR. WERNER: Again, actually, those radiation was measured here along the coast in very low levels. Yes. Actually, it does all add up. But still very low level as compared to, for instance, the CAT scan they talking, you know, thousands of more times of radiation due to CAT scans, which you get naturally.

MR. COLLINS: I'd like to add a few thoughts. Your question about who adds it up, who takes a look at the total picture. I think it's well-established, I think, N.R.C. believes, you know, there is no threshold linear relationship in any, any exposure to radiation has the prospect. Now at the levels we're talking about is practically negligible and incalculable.

There are many on other sources of radiation. For N.R.C. licensed material, which is the nuclear power plant and most medical uses, cobalt therapies and many of the diagnostic treatments, you know, we look at those, look at those radiation exposures.

In terms of risk to people off-site at San Onofre, we are engaged currently with the National Academy of Sciences to propel another cancer study to see what the data does show with respect to that.

The previous study did not show a correlation of increased cancer with respect to exposure from nuclear power plant, but we are engaged again to redo that study. It's a very difficult study. When you take 0.1 perhaps calculable dose compared that to 2 rem, 5 rem from CAT scans and other radiation, how do you ease that out in the study. That's what the National Academy of Science is struggling with that right now, how they got to do that. We are serious about that and we want to complete that study as best we can. We'll see where it goes.

Q. (? @22:42 Inaudible) During the last year?

MR. COLLINS: You're potentially referring to the E.P.A.

Q. Right.

MR. COLLINS: Radiation potentially.

Q. Radiation how much -- (? Inaudible @ 23:00).

MR. DANIEL: We wouldn't be in a position.

MR. COLLINS: I just don't have the information.

MR. DANIEL: We are going to here from Lynn Harris Hicks next here.

Q. (BY MS. HICKS:) I live two miles from San Onofre. I lived there for most of my life. And my children and grandchildren are living in the radiation that you put forth. And we know that it has raised what they call a natural background. There is no natural background of radiation. It is a man-made poison. It is the worst poison we have every discovered to put out to kill people. It is being used to kill people in the countries overseas in the armaments. And we just can't keep on doing this.

When you sit there and talk about -- you have to look to a little more to see what happened on this one and that one, and you don't have any idea whether when you once you start it again, the next week it be all over again in the different tubes because the truth of it is that the metals are the basic fault here and that won't be mentioned because that's the way the nuclear industry has gotten all of its -- I shouldn't say all of it -- the nuclear industry has gotten its guarantees, loan guarantees, because without the loan guarantees they couldn't build anything.

They waited a generation. I mustn't get off on that. The point is when you know you have not been able to create an alloy which can resist the terrible disruptive action of this terrible technology, why do you go ahead looking for the little bits of fragments of what might have influenced making it worse or less worse when our lives are in the -- our lives, they harm us and probably more than because we are learning every day about Fukushima that that radiation is coming over to us and more and more people, particularly the children. How can you do that? How can you look in the mirror and do that?

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Miss Hicks. Charles.

MR. COLLINS: I'd like to just comment. There is probably nothing I can say to say Miss Hicks. I do appreciate her sentiment and her challenge to us as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to make sure we do our job with respect to safety. And on these particular issues, I'll just tell you that we are committed that we understand this the best science and engineering that is available right now. And San Onofre will not run again until we are satisfied. Thank you for your comment.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. Elmo.

MR. COLLINS: Doing time check. We have to be out by 10.

MR. DANIEL: Okay. This is going to be our final question. Charles.

Q. (BY MR. GRIFFIN:) My name is Charles Griffin. I'd like to speak about the tubes. My wife just passed away in December from lung cancer. But about the tubes and you've learned tonight that this is a different design. I've learned tonight that it's quite a bit different design than what was originally there. And why didn't it trigger -- I initialed the California Environmental Quality Act in 1970. It was passed by Nixon and Governor Brown passed the California Environmental Quality Act. Why isn't there an (? @ 27:43) Environmental Impact Report, the protection act, why Environmental Impact Report for the tubes on this and because it involves looking for alternatives.

Certainly we have cheap, natural gas and that's certainly a workable alternative, we build a gas facility at John Wayne airport. We can build local ones. We can put it out in the desert. We don't have to cover desert with solar cells. We also can build an alternative utilizing hydrogen and boron and make a fusion reactor there the size of a bathroom and you can put in any substation and diversify this. Thank you.

MR. DANIEL: Thank you, Charles.

MR. COLLINS: Make sure I understand your question.

Q. Environmental impact report. Why you haven't done it?

MR. COLLINS: Thank you. Federal law tells us when the Environmental impact statement.

Q. I got to go to court, judge decide

A. I'm sorry. I stated that poorly. That wasn't what I wanted to convey. First of all, let me express my condolences on the loss of your wife. I'm sorry to hear that. The licensing, the N.R.C. and the implementation of our provisions, you know, has those in our regulations about when an environmental impact statement should be triggered.

We believe we followed those regulations in this instance, but we also acknowledge because of the prospect for license amendment which might trigger additional reviews and additional Federal actions and at least a statement of no significant hazards determination. We got to go back and do our inspection and review and make sure we got this one right. It's actually a question we're asking ourselves, as well. We haven't arrived at the answer yet. Thank you.

MR. DANIEL: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm sorry. The night is wearing long. Please give us your questions on those feedback forms, but before you go, I want to thank you for the thoughtful questions and comments that you all came out and asked. I want to thank you. You have been a wonderful audience. Thank you very much. I will let Mr. Collins have the last word here.

MR. COLLINS: I just want to -- I already said what I wanted to say that's my personal appreciation for you taking the time to come out. Your questions, we tried our best to answer your question and forthright with it. To restate what we've indicated a number of times, we're not satisfied yet. A lot of work has to be done for this difficult technical issue. We will have more meetings and we're going to continue to talk about it before N.R.C. makes a decision. I expect I will see you again and we'll get to talk about this some more. Thank you for your attendance tonight.

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Title NRC Meeting Transcript for 2012-06-18
Pub Date 2012-06-18
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Note Mentions Michael Aguirre, Ray Lutz
Keywords Nuclear Energy, Shut San Onofre
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Topic revision: r13 - 2016-05-16, UnknownUser

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