Election Data Security -- Regular Ballot Image Backups

CitizensOversight (2026-04-09) RaymondLutz

This Page: copswiki.org/Common/M2047
Media Link: https://copswiki.org/w/pub/Common/M2047/SOS_Letter__Election_Data_Security,_Retention,_and_Public_Integrity_Safeguards.pdf
Remote Link: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1cK9P3AaI8YARqV2goM-n6ncrsP0foC15yGsWSJjzIwk/edit?usp=sharing
More Info: ElectionIntegrity

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CALL TO ACTION -- YOU CAN HELP!

Please contact your election office and ask them if they are making election data backups!

SUGGESTED MESSAGE:

Offsite Election Backups
Background:
Law enforcement has started taking ballots and other election data to investigate.
A Federal District Court has already ruled the FBI can seize and keep ballots for investigations.
The California Supreme Court will rule if Sheriffs can do this. Natural disasters and accidents are also risks.
Proposal:
Each election office needs to be prepared with two offsite backup copies of all the ballot images created by election scanners and other vote records, in case paper ballots and records are impounded or suffer disaster.
Put the copies, sealed, into offsite safes as they are scanned. Two backups let law enforcement seize one, and the office still keeps one.
For Those Offices Routinely Deleting Data:
Some jurisdictions claim that there is no reason to save ballot images that have been created by ballot scanners, and in some cases, they set these machines to routinely delete them.
If they say there is no need for the ballot images "because we have the paper ballots," the need for these secure backups makes the case for keeping that valuable data.

ALL STATES HAVE BEEN CONTACTED!

Status: This letter was separately emailed to all states and territories election officials, usually to the Secretary of State.

Open PDF

AI Summary: Election Record Security and Backup Practices

This document recommends practical procedures for protecting digital election records from loss, disaster, or investigative seizure by creating secure, independent backups throughout the election process. It was prompted by recent federal seizures of election materials, which demonstrated that local jurisdictions may temporarily lose access to critical election records.

The primary recommendation is to create snapshot backups of ballot images and other election data as they become available during normal election operations, rather than waiting until the election is complete. Two identical copies should be stored in separate secure government facilities to ensure that records remain available even if election systems or original media become unavailable.

The document suggests creating backups:

  • After early voting scanners are closed and data is transferred to the Election Management System (EMS).
  • After election-day scanner uploads are completed.
  • At the end of each day of central scanning for mail and provisional ballots.
  • At the completion of ballot processing for final archival records.

In addition to ballot images, election offices are encouraged to preserve:

  • Cast Vote Records (CVRs)
  • Electronic pollbook data
  • System logs
  • Other digital election records

Where supported by the election system, each exported dataset should be accompanied by a published SHA-256 hash or digital signature so the integrity of the backup can be independently verified without revealing its contents.

The document also notes that ballot images can generally be reanalyzed using compatible election equipment or independent auditing software, even if the original Election Management System is unavailable. As a result, preserving these records substantially improves disaster recovery, election transparency, and public confidence. Election officials are encouraged to pilot these backup procedures during upcoming elections and incorporate them into standard operating procedures.