Direct link to this page: http://www.copswiki.org/Common/ElectionAudits
This project provides a place to gather up and organize links to various initiatives regarding audits, including statistical and exhaustive approaches.
Risk-Limiting Audits by Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections (SUITE) | Springer Link
Several other methods at:
Work continues studying Bayesian methods that are much more efficient, but aren't yet known to be risk-limiting.
From Harvie Branscomb:
The following linked document is a comprehensive set of steps for a risk limiting ballot comparison tabulation audit that I assembled prior to the second meeting of the audit advisory group appointed by the CO SOS in January 2017. I believe it largely complies with the guidelines listed in the Lutz memo just sent out. And the CO audit is actually being implemented along the lines of these steps as well. The major differences between these steps and the actual implementation are the use of the RLATool special purpose software rather than basic paper forms for capture of sampled voter intent, and the selection of contests to drive the audit done by the SOS rather than by choice of narrowest margin countywide contest. I think it may be useful for designers of other risk limiting post election tabulation audits to read this document:
There is a shorter more abstracted version was also contemporaneously created by members of SAWG linked here:
The public records of the audit advisory group including the two above are located here (many other comment documents may be useful):
There is a vast public record rulemaking that implemented regulations for the Colorado audit.
There is extensive written testimony regarding proposed rules for implementation of the RLTA such as this here:
and in more detail here, focusing on the discussion of the text of Rule 25 that implements the CO RLTA:
and this followup to the above in response to comments by Boulder County:
The following linked writing discusses the need for disassociation of tabulation batches from eligibility batches, both in numbering and in content such that batches cannot be linked in a mail ballot or central count process with mixed styles (e.g.vote center). Sufficient disassociation will allow paper ballots to be viewed in public, as the best practices for audit require:
Above documents are all from this rulemaking page:
And the the resulting Rule 25 that implements the audit in current form is found here:
I think Ray has asked me to provide this kind of material in the past, and I apologize for not sending it earlier.
Colorado Audt Center
Summary of articles submitted (Add | All):
Number of topics: 9
- (M1879) 2018-09-10 White Paper: Election Audit Strategy -- Ray Lutz, Citizens Oversight,
- (M1884) 2017-01-31 CLIP Audit -- Ronald Rivest, MIT,
- (ElectionAuditBestPractices) 2016-08-08 Election Audit Best Practices -- Ray Lutz, Citizens Oversight,
- (M1678) 2012-10 Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits: Why and How -- Risk-Limiting Audits Working Group, Risk-Limiting Audits Working Group,
- (M1807) 2012 BRAVO: Ballot-polling Risk-limiting Audits to Verify Outcomes -- Mark Lindeman, Philip Stark Vincent Yates, Department of Statistics University of California, Berkeley,
- (M1729) 2008-09 Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits -- , electionaudits.org,
- (M1503) 2008-07-01 Improving the Security, Transparency and Efficiency of California's 1% Manual Tally Procedures -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall, UC Berkeley School of Information, Manual Tally Procedures
- (M1683) 2008 Procedures for California's 1% Manual Tally -- Joseph Hall, UCBerkeley,
- (M1883) 2007-11-05 Elections board workers take plea deal -- Karl Turner, cleveland.com, Features Michael Vu
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